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The theme of this study relates to the basic values of contract law: Is breach of contract a wrong? Is compensation the sole 
objective of contractual remedies? Does – and should – breach of contract pay? 
 
The themes reflect in the subject of the study, which is the disgorgement of profits under the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the “CISG” or “Convention”). The disgorgement of profits is a legal remedy that may 
come to question if breaching a contract is profitable to the defaulting party even though the aggrieved party is compensated. 
Disgorging profits denotes awarding the profit that arises out of the breach to the aggrieved party.  
 
The study discusses three research questions. The first question enquires whether a trend in domestic contract laws to expand the 
availability of disgorgement damages should be taken into account in the interpretation of the CISG. The issue revolves around the 
principle of uniform application. The principle entails that the interpreter should not read the Convention through the lenses of 
domestic law, but rather as an autonomous body of law. 
 
As a response to the first research question, the study suggests that the pro-disgorgement trend should not influence the 
interpretation of the CISG. The main reason for the conclusion is that the trend favouring disgorgement does not concern the 
majority of the CISG states, and taking such a trend into account in the interpretation of the CISG involves a significant risk of 
fragmenting the interpretation. 
 
The second research question asks if the CISG provides for disgorgement. The study reviews the wording and the legislative 
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does not incur loss as a result of breach of contract, it is not in line with the CISG to grant disgorgement as a remedy. Such 
interpretation would be in glaring conflict with the wording of the Article. However, the study also suggests that the principle of 
protecting contractual performance may warrant an expansive reading of the term ‘loss’, thus leading to a comparable result as a 
true disgorgement remedy. 
 
The third and final research question asks whether the profit arising out of a breach can function as a measurement stick for 
compensatory damages. While the previous research question relates to granting the disgorgement of profits irrespective of 
whether the aggrieved party incurred loss, this section concerns the calculation of the loss caused by breach of contract. The study 
concludes that using the breaching party’s profit in the calculation of loss fits well in the framework of quantifying compensatory 
damages within the CISG, if the aggrieved party is able to show that the method is best suited to the circumstances of the 
individual case.  
 
To conclude, the study reflects on the disgorgement of profits through three questions; whether national developments on the area 
should impact the interpretation of the Convention, whether the CISG provides for disgorgement and whether the breaching party’s 
profits can be taken into account in quantifying the aggrieved party’s loss. As regards the bigger question of whether breach of 
contract pays – yes, it sometimes does. However, it is the legislator, not the interpreter, who can change this conclusion. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Policy perspectives 
Breach of contract sometimes pays. In many jurisdictions, the party that breaches a 
contract may retain the eventual benefits of the breach after contractual damages have been 
deducted.
1
 If breach of contract were a crime, state would collect such profits with interest. 
The recovery of the proceeds of a crime holds a place in the heart of criminal law 
sanctions.
2
  
The fact that the fruits of breach of contract often stay with the breaching party follows 
from the philosophy of private law. Oliver Wendell Holmes has famously described a 
contractual obligation as ‘a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it – 
and nothing else’.3 In this ideology, private law is not meant to punish, but to enforce 
private relationships.
4
 The fact that punishment has been restricted to the domain of 
criminal law has even been lauded as a cultural achievement of developed legal systems.
5
 
Despite the foregoing, elements of punishment are in fact present in contract law.
6
 By way 
of example, the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010
7
 provide 
for a judicial penalty. Under this concept, a court may order a breaching party to pay a fine 
to the aggrieved party if the breaching party fails to comply with a court order to perform. 
The breaching party pays the sum to the aggrieved party even though the institution has 
been dubbed a ‘penalty’. 8 
                                                 
1
 Ewoud Hondius and André Janssen, ‘Chapter 26. Disgorgement of Profits: Gain-Based Remedies 
throughout the World’ in Hondius E and Janssen A (eds), Disgorgement of Profits: Gain-Based Remedies 
throughout the World (Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015) 476. 
2
 Pekka Viljanen, Konfiskaatio rikosoikeudellisena seuraamuksena (Edita Publishing Oy 2007) 63. 
3
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 462. 
4
 Brian Coote, ‘Contract Damages, Ruxley, and the Performance Interest’ (1997) 56 Cambridge Law Journal 
537, 541. The opposing school opines that breaching a contract is immoral per se, and that contract law 
should properly reflect this immorality. Ben Depoorter and Stephen Tontrup, ‘How Law Frames Moral 
Intuitions: the Expressive Effect of Specific Performance’ (2012) 54 Arizona Law Review 673, 706. 
5
 Ingeborg Schwenzer, Pascal Hachem and Christopher Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 579, para 44.06.  
6
 ibid, 580, para 44.12. 
7
 Referred to as the ‘PICC 2010’ below. 
8
 Art. 7.2.4. PICC 2010. 
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The disgorgement of profits is another private law remedy that has been considered to 
penalise the breaching party. Disgorgement strips the profits arising out of breach of 
contract from the defaulting party, thus determining the remedy on the basis of the profit 
generated by the breach.
9
  
To put the issue into a more concrete context, consider the following: A from Finland and 
B from Germany enter into a contract for the sale of shoes. The seller A undertakes not to 
sell the same brand of shoes to the market where B operates. However, B’s competitor C, 
operating on the same market, offers A a hefty bonus for obtaining a batch of shoes of the 
same brand. A then decides to breach the exclusivity clause in the contract with B, and sell 
shoes to C. 
In this hypothetical,
10
 A obtains profit for the breach of contract, while B does not 
necessarily incur recoverable damage. B is likely to suffer some loss in some sense of the 
word, e.g. a decrease in market share. However, such loss is likely to be unrecoverable, 
difficult to prove and quantify. Under the CISG, B is entitled to compensation for the 
damage that he incurred as a result of the breach of exclusivity clause, and only to the 
extent that B can prove with reasonable certainty.
11
 
As A’s profit may well exceed B’s damages, breach of contract may prove to be a lucrative 
business move for A even after he pays compensation to B. Allowing for such a result is 
counterintuitive.
12
 Permitting the breaching party to benefit from a breach of contract 
opposes the ages old maxim of pacta sunt servanda (‘contracts must be honoured’). This is 
where disgorgement of profits comes in, reallocating the ‘illicit profit’ to the non-
defaulting party.
13
 
The debate surrounding disgorgement can be understood through the question of who is 
entitled to the profit flowing from breach of contract.
14
 Awarding windfall profit to the 
                                                 
9
 Allan E. Farnsworth, ‘Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of 
Contract’ (1985) 94(6) The Yale Law Journal 1339, 1341; Hondius and Janssen (n 1) 475. 
10
 Cf. BRI Production "Bonaventure" v. Pan African Export, a case with similar facts. 
11
 CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, para 2.6.  
12
 Sarah Worthington, ‘Reconsidering Disgorgement for Wrongs’ (1999) 62(2) Modern Law Review 218, 
218. 
13
 Hondius and Janssen (n 1) 475. 
14
 Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem, ‘The Scope of the CISG Provisions on Damages’ in Saidov D 
and Cunnington R (eds), Contract Damages. Domestic and International Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2008 
pp. 91–106) 95. 
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promisee is problematic in that it may bring the promisee in a better position than if the 
contract had been performed. Should the contractual entitlement be the maximum amount 
of damages, or should policy issues that are independent of the contract affect the 
remedy?
15
 In other words, do contractual remedies only exist to secure the financial end 
result of the contract, or do they serve additional purposes?
16
  
Deterring breach of contract and other private law wrongs is one justification for the 
existence of penal elements in legal remedies in legislation beyond the realm of criminal 
law.
17
 The deterring effect of contractual remedies discourages from breaching a contract. 
For example, as regards the judicial penalty set forth in PICC 2010, the remedy functions 
as deterrence against non-compliance of a court order.
18
  
In some circumstances, the deterring effect is more justified than in others. Commentators 
have recommended that disgorgement damages be available for breaches of contract that 
are morally reprehensible, as the deterring effect is more warranted due to the nature of the 
breach.
19
 Policy perspectives, such as whether contractual remedies should have a 
deterring effect, and who is entitled to the profit arising out of a breach, lurk behind this 
study. While neither theme is directly relevant to the question of whether the CISG 
provides for disgorgement or not, policy perspectives are nevertheless necessary for an 
analysis on disgorgement. Legislation does not exist in a vacuum. It is essential to be 
familiar with the values that lie behind the norms and their effects on the society.
20
 
1.2. Sources of law 
As the discussion above illustrates, the core values of legislation are deeply relevant for the 
discussion on disgorgement. In light of this, the CISG offers an interesting legal 
framework to for an examination of disgorgement. The CISG represents a compromise 
                                                 
15
 Ernst J. Weinrib, ‘Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies’ (2003) 78 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 55, 57. 
16
 Coote (n 4), 540. 
17
 It is arguable whether breach of contract should even be characterised as a ‘wrong’. See Richard Posner, 
‘Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker’ (2009) 107 Michigan Law Review 1349, 1349; Farnsworth (n 9) 
1341. 
18
 See Alexander Pekelis, ‘Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies: A Comparative Study’ (1943) 41(4) 
Michigan Law Review 665, 671 (as regards the corresponding French concept of ‘astreinte’). 
19
 Daniel Friedmann, ‘Restitution of Benefits Obtained through the Appropriation of Property or the 
Commission of a Wrong’ (1980) 80(3) Columbia Law Review 504, 558. 
20
 Marc A. Loth, ‘Limits of Private Law: Enriching Legal Dogmatics’ (2007) 35(4) Hofstra Law Review 
1725, 1736, who also refers to differing opinions on the issue. 
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between legal traditions, and the values that underlie legislation differ from one 
jurisdiction to other.
21
 
The CISG is an international treaty and a uniform sales law. When implemented, the CISG 
displaces the state’s substantive law and private international law rules concerning the 
international sale of goods. The CISG defines its scope of application autonomously in 
Articles 1–6 CISG.22 The contracting parties may choose another law to govern their 
contract, but if they choose not to, the CISG automatically applies when the requirements 
under the aforementioned Articles are met.
23
 
The CISG is often described as one of the most successful instruments in the 
harmonisation of international trade law. Up to 85 states have implemented the 
Convention, including most important trade nations of the world (with the exception of the 
United Kingdom).
24
 Adding to the influence of the CISG, it has also impacted certain 
domestic sales laws. For example, the Finland and Sweden modernised their sales laws in 
the 80s on the basis of the Convention.
25
 
The aim of the CISG is to reduce transaction costs by providing international norms for the 
sale of goods. The CISG enables the contracting parties to choose a neutral law to govern 
their contract.
26
 Moreover, the differences in national legal systems hamper the 
                                                 
21
 Nils Schmidt-Ahrendts, ‘CISG and Arbitration’ [2011] Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade – 
International Edition 211, 212. 
22
 Michael Bridge, The International Sale of Goods. Law and Practice (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2007), 506, para 11.01. 
23
 Party autonomy is set forth in Art. 6 CISG. To summarise the main rules under Arts. 1–6 CISG, the 
Convention is applicable to a sales contract involving movable goods if the contracting parties are from 
different contracting states, or if the law of a contracting state becomes applicable through private 
international law rules. As an exception to the main rule, the CISG does not govern the validity of the 
contract or compensation for personal injury or death. 
24
 Sieg Eiselen, ‘The CISG as Bridge between Common and Civil Law’ in DiMatteo, Larry (ed.), 
International Sales Law: A Global Challenge. (Cambridge University Press 2014 pp. 612–629), 613; 
UNCITRAL Internet page citing the contracting states, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html (accessed 21 May 
2016). 
25
 Joseph Lookofsky, ‘Alive and Well in Scandinavia: CISG Part II’ (1999) 8 Journal of Law and Commerce 
289, 289. 
26
 Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem, ‘Preamble’ in Schwenzer I (ed), Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2010 pp. 13–17), 
16, para 8. 
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development of international trade due to, inter alia, the difficulty in resolving conflicts of 
laws.
27
  
However, an international sales law cannot attain the goals set out above if courts and 
tribunals interpret it differently around the world. The CISG is a set of norms that co-exists 
with the domestic sales law in approximately 85 different countries. If domestic 
characteristics were allowed to leak in the application of the Convention in each 
contracting states, the uniform law would be reduced to 85 different international sales 
laws.
28
 The noble aim of reaching an absolute uniformity in the interpretation of the CISG 
in all respects is, of course, unattainable in practice.
29
  
The large body of international case law and jurisprudence are a challenge to the uniform 
interpretation of the Convention. In principle, CISG cases from Anchorage, Damascus and 
Shanghai are equally relevant case law to a Finnish interpreter.
30
 The seemingly impossible 
task of even finding case law, let alone understanding it, is alleviated by the Internet and 
the efforts of universities and UNCITRAL in producing translations and summaries of 
CISG cases.
31
 
Domestic preconceptions may unintentionally colour legal research on the topic of the 
CISG, for instance, this study and its analysis on disgorgement. The most likely bias in this 
study is Finnish contract law. To briefly introduce the lenses of domestic law that I 
inevitably have on, a close relationship between regulatory norms and case law guidance is 
a characteristic of Finnish and Nordic contract law. By contrast, continental law is 
typically based on codifications of law, and common law systems are built on case law and 
precedents. Finnish contract law is partly based on codified law, just as continental law 
                                                 
27
 Larry DiMatteo, Lucien Dhooge, Stephanie Greene, Virginia Maurer and Marisa Pagnattaro, International 
Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press 2005), 11. 
28
 Ingeborg Schwenzer and Pascal Hachem, ‘Chapter 2. General Provisions. Art. 7’ in Schwenzer I (ed.), 
Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (3
rd
 edn, Oxford University 
Press 2010 pp. 120–144), 123, para 8.  
29
 Robert Hillman, ‘Applying the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods: The Elusive Goal of Uniformity’ [1995] Cornell Review of the Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods 21, 21. 
30
 Franco Ferrari, ‘CISG Case Law: A New Challenge for Interpreters?’ (1998) 4/5 Journal of International 
Business & Law 495, 524. 
31
 For example, UNCITRAL Digests on CISG case law is accessible at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law/digests/cisg.html; the Pace University Law School CISG case 
database is accessible at: http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/caseschedule.html.  
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traditions, but it also emphasises the importance of specific cases so as to realise a 
reasonable and equitable end result in a particular case.
32
 
Furthermore, the fact that the CISG is an autonomous sales law complicates the systematic 
analysis of disgorgement. In legal research, scholars typically observe a certain 
phenomenon within the system of law.
33
 For example, in the case of this study, it would be 
beneficial to review disgorgement in the systematic of private law.
34
 However, the entirety 
of private law looks different in various contracting states, as the contracting states of the 
Convention represent different legal families and traditions.
35
 Choosing any individual 
national system leads to incomplete findings. 
In certain parts, I will compare the CISG to other international instruments and uniform 
law projects, such as the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC 
2010) and the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL 1998/2002). Both collections 
of norms represent principles that are common to many domestic laws, in which respect 
they bear a similarity to the CISG.
36
 Hence, PICC 2010 and PECL are interesting points of 
reference. However, in contrast to the Convention, the PICC 2010 and the PECL are not 
binding sources of law, unless contracting parties choose to apply them to a certain 
contract.
37
  
1.3. Scope of the study and methodology 
The research questions of this study revolve around the same theme: the disgorgement of 
profits in the context of the CISG. I will approach the theme from three different angles, 
through separate research questions. Below, I will elaborate on the each of the research 
questions that this study examines.  
                                                 
32
 Matti Rudanko, ‘Pohjoismainen sopimusoikeusajattelu ja kansainvälistyvä sopimusoikeus’ (2014) 7–8 
Lakimies 1006, 1007. See also Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee (n 5) 89, para 6.15 and Ewoud Hondius, ‘Pro-
Active Comparative Law: The Case of Nordic Law’ (2007) 46 Scandinavian Studies in Law, Stockholm 
Institute for Scandinavian Law 143, 145–147. 
33
 Ari Hirvonen, Mitkä metodit? Opas oikeustieteen metodologiaan (Yleisen oikeustieteen julkaisuja 17 
2011) 39. 
34
 As regards the systematic analysis of CISG norms, see also Schwenzer and Hachem (n 28), 130, para 21. 
35
 Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee (n 5) 34–35, para 3.07. 
36
 E. Allan Farnsworth, ‘American Provenance of the UNIDROIT Principles’ (1998) 72(6) Tulane Law 
Review 1985, 1986. 
37
 Preamble, UNIDROIT Principles 2010. 
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The first research question relates to the general rules of the interpretation of the CISG, and 
the role that national sales laws have in the process. Namely, prof. Schwenzer, a well-
known CISG scholar, has suggested that the developments in domestic laws favouring 
disgorgement damages should impact the interpretation of the CISG.
38
 In Chapter 4, I 
discuss whether this statement is well-grounded. The question relates to the core of 
interpretation of the CISG, the principle of uniform application. The conventional view 
following from the principle maintains that courts and tribunals should not have regard to 
national laws in applying the CISG. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the Convention 
may decrease if the international sales law develops into a different direction than domestic 
sales laws, thus hindering the success of the CISG.  
To describe the methodology as regards the first research question, I mainly approach the 
question on an abstract level. This means that I balance principles of the interpretation of 
the CISG, without attempting to deliver an answer on how to resolve specific legal 
problem. Due to the abstract nature of the first research question, I focus on ideology and 
objectives instead of entertaining a practical analysis of case law and related sources. 
With regard to the first research question, my conclusion is that the pro-disgorgement trend 
should not influence the interpretation of the CISG. The reasons for this conclusion are that 
the development of expanding the scope of the disgorgement remedy does not concern the 
majority of the world of the CISG, and therefore placing emphasis on the trend in the 
interpretation of the CISG involves a significant risk of fragmenting the interpretation. In 
addition, I argue that if the alteration in interpretation follows from changing values, and 
not a change in factual circumstances, concerns arise regarding the justification of the new 
interpretation. Such concerns are warranted especially if the new interpretation conflicts 
with the wording of the treaty, as is the case with respect to disgorgement and the CISG. 
The second research question is more concrete, asking if the CISG allows for a claim for 
disgorgement. I lay the groundwork for answering this question in Chapter 3, where I 
introduce the options for a legal basis for disgorgement under the CISG, and describe the 
conventional measures of damages under the CISG. In Chapter 5, I peruse the provision 
that proves to be the most appropriate basis for a claim for disgorgement, Article 74 CISG. 
                                                 
38
 Ingeborg Schwenzer ‘Section II. Damages. Arts. 74–77’ in Ingeborg Schwenzer I (ed), Commentary on the 
UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2010 pp. 999–
1049), 1017, para 43. 
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The methodology of this part represents a traditional method of legal dogmatics that 
focuses on the normative content of the CISG provisions.
39
 While the starting point of 
interpretation is the wording of the text, determining the content of the CISG requires 
additional interpretative tools.
40 
My conclusion in Chapter 5 is it is not in line to grant a monetary remedy under the CISG 
if the aggrieved party does not incur loss as a result of the breach of contract.
41
 A remedy 
granted under Article 74 CISG should not be in glaring conflict with the wording of the 
article. However, I also argue that the principle of protecting contractual performance may 
warrant an expansive reading of the term ‘loss’, which may lead to a comparable result as a 
true disgorgement remedy. I come to this conclusion based on the argument that traditional 
compensatory damages do not in all cases adequately fulfil the objective of protecting 
contractual performance. 
The third and final research question asks whether the profit arising out of a breach can 
function as a measurement stick for compensatory damages. While the previous research 
question relates to granting the disgorgement of profits irrespective of whether the 
aggrieved party incurred loss (a true disgorgement remedy), this section relates to the 
calculation of the loss caused by breach of contract. The relevance of damage is the key 
difference between a true disgorgement remedy and calculating loss based on the 
breaching party’s profit. For a true disgorgement remedy, it is irrelevant whether the 
aggrieved party incurs loss. By contrast, in calculating compensatory damages, the 
aggrieved party is not entitled to damages if no loss was incurred.
42
 
In the final Chapter, I introduce the legal framework behind the quantification of damages 
under Article 74 CISG. Furthermore, I go on to analyse an arbitral award where the 
promisor’s profit was used as a measurement of damages. In other words, the methodology 
of this part is similarly dogmatic as the previous Chapter. To respond to the final research 
question, I argue that using the breaching party’s profit in the calculation of loss fits well in 
                                                 
39
 Hirvonen (n 33) 21–22. 
40
 Pilar Perales Viscasillas, ‘Article 7’ in Kröll S, Mistelis L and Perales Viscasillas P (eds), UN Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (C.H.Beck – Hart – Nomos 2011 pp. 111–141), 125, 
para 33; Schwenzer and Hachem (n 28), 130, para 21. 
41
 Despite the generality of this statement, I do not mean to take a stand on price reduction, which is available 
under the CISG. 
42
 Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee (n 5) 581, para 44.15. 
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the framework of quantifying compensatory damages, if the aggrieved party is able to 
show that the method is best suited to the circumstances of the individual case.  
 
2. NOTION OF DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS  
Before commencing the analysis of the research questions set out above, in this Chapter 2, 
I describe the notion of disgorgement in general terms. I will first introduce the 
terminology relating to the concept as well as the basic characteristic of the institution. 
Subsequently, I will offer further insights and context for the remedy from the perspective 
of corrective justice theories and the economic analysis of law. 
2.1. Terminology 
Disgorgement of profits refers to skimming off the gains that a wrongdoer has made by a 
wrong.
43
 Disgorgement often entails awarding the disgorged profits to the afflicted party, 
but not in all cases. For instance, under the Chinese Anti-Unfair Competition Law, profits 
obtained by a violation of competition law are handed over to the national treasury.
44
 In a 
contract law setting, however, disgorgement denotes a remedy whereby the profits are 
awarded to the aggrieved party. 
As opposed to damages, disgorgement is not a remedy that is generally available for all 
kinds of private law wrongs in most jurisdictions. Rather, it is typically scattered around in 
special provisions in different areas of private law.
45
 Sometimes remedies that entail the 
stripping of profits have been hidden under a misleading label.
46
 It has also been suggested 
that the aim of legislation enabling class actions follows from the goal of disgorging illegal 
profits.
47
 
                                                 
43
 Farnsworth (n 9) 1341–1342; Hondius and Janssen (n 1) 475–476. 
44
 Hondius and Janssen (n 1) 495. 
45
 ibid, 476–478. 
46
 ibid; Kruithof M, ‘Disgorgement of Profits in Belgian Private Law’ in Hondius E and Janssen A (eds), 
Disgorgement of Profits: Gain-Based Remedies throughout the World (Springer International Publishing 
Switzerland 2015 pp. 89–120) 90 (for example, Belgian law does provide for disgorgement in theory, but in 
practice, the profits can in certain rare cases be stripped under the banner of compensation.) 
47
 Niamh Connolly, ‘Disgorgement in Ireland’ in Hondius E and Janssen A (eds), Disgorgement of Profits: 
Gain-Based Remedies throughout the World (Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 pp. 71–88) 
83; Martin A. Hogg, ‘Disgorgement of Profits in Scots Law’ in Hondius E and Janssen A (eds), 
Disgorgement of Profits: Gain-Based Remedies throughout the World (Springer International Publishing 
Switzerland 2015 pp. 325–344) 341. 
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Terminology in this area causes confusion: disgorgement is also referred to as the ‘account 
of profits’, ‘restitutionary damages’ or a ‘gain-based remedy’.48 The term ‘account of 
profits’ bears a connotation to remedies under equity in the common law tradition49, 
whereas the term ‘restitutionary damages’ has been criticised for its close resemblance to 
the law of restitution
50
. ‘Gain-based remedy’, on the other hand, can be viewed as an 
umbrella term describing different kinds of awards of sums that are measured by the 
defendant’s gain.51 ‘Disgorgement of profits’ seems to be the most appropriate word in an 
international setting due to the lack of misleading connotations.
52
 As ‘disgorgement’ is also 
the word of choice in the context of the CISG, this study employs the term.
 53
. 
The concepts of a restitutionary remedy and disgorgement are distinct.  As a general 
characterisation, restitution is a remedy whereby the defendant is ordered to give 
something back to the plaintiff. By contrast, in disgorgement, the defendant is required to 
give something up.
54
 In the framework of the CISG, the term ‘restitution’ refers to the 
returning of contractual performances following an avoidance of contract, as provided for 
by Article 81 CISG.
55
 
To briefly give a general idea of the ideological difference between the notions of unjust 
enrichment and disgorging profits arising from breach of contract: Unjust enrichment is 
                                                 
48
 Mathias Siems, ’Disgorgement of profits for breach of contract: a comparative analysis’ (2003) 7(1) 
Edinburgh Law Review 27, 28. 
49
 Hondius and Janssen (n 1) 477. Equitable wrongs (which are typical of common law traditions) include, 
inter alia, the breach of fiduciary duty. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 2nd edition, a fiduciary duty 
relates to a party that ‘must act for another. They are entrusted with the care of property or funds’. 
Commentators have considered that e.g. the public interest in the integrity of the fiduciary relationship 
justifies the nature of the exceptional remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty. See, Paul B. Miller, ‘Justifying 
Fiduciary Remedies’ (2013) 63 University of Toronto Law Review 570, 586–602. 
50
 Farnsworth (n 9) 1342; cf. Stephen Waddams, ‘Gains Derived from Breach of Contract: Historical and 
Conceptual Perspectives’ in Saidov D and Cunnington R (eds), Contract Damages. Domestic and 
International Perspectives (Hart Publishing 2008 pp. 187–206) 193 (noting that the term ‘law of restitution’ 
has also been used as a synonym for the institution of unjust enrichment); cf. Lionel Smith, ‘Restitution: The 
Heart of Corrective Justice’ (2001) 79 Texas Law Review 2115, 2116 (who understands ‘the law of 
restitution’ as containing two separate parts: ‘disgorgement for wrongdoing’ and ‘subtractive unjust 
enrichment’).  
51
 Andrew Botterell, ‘Contractual performance, corrective justice, and disgorgement for breach of contract’ 
(2010) 16(3) Legal Theory 135, 136. 
52
 Hondius and Janssen (n 1) 476. 
53
 The term is used by Schwenzer (n 38) 1017, para 43; Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee (n 5) and Nils Schmidt-
Ahrendts, ‘Disgorgement of Profits under the CISG’ in Schwenzer I and Spagnolo L (eds), State of Play: The 
3rd Annual MAA Schlechtriem CISG Conference (Eleven International Publishing 2012 pp. 89–102). 
54
 Botterell (n 51) 136–137.  
55
 Christiana Fountoulakis, ‘Section I. Effects of avoidance. Arts. 81–84’ In Schwenzer, Ingeborg (ed.), 
Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (Oxford University Press 
2010 pp. 1095–1145) 1106, para 17. 
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meant to return a sum that the defendant received unjustly at the expense of the plaintiff. 
Disgorgement of profits, on the other hand, rather aims at stripping off the profit that was 
generated by doing wrong to the plaintiff.
56
 In disgorgement, the profit to be disgorged is 
not necessarily obtained at the expense of the aggrieved party. 
Disgorgement focuses on the breaching party, rather than the aggrieved party. For 
disgorgement, it is irrelevant whether the aggrieved party has incurred damage. It is thus 
possible that the party is awarded a sum that exceeds the loss, yielding a windfall profit to 
the aggrieved party. Following from this characteristic, disgorgement can be characterised 
as a supra-compensatory remedy
57
  
In contrast to disgorgement, compensatory damages are centred around the aggrieved 
party. Compensatory damages are meant to ‘undo’ the effects of the breach, and they are 
measured by the loss that the aggrieved party suffers. In other words, damages are 
designed to give the aggrieved party the ‘benefit of the bargain’.58 In this study, the 
umbrella term ‘compensatory damages’ does not include disgorgement, as the remedy does 
not seek to indemnify the non-defaulting party, even if compensation may be its side 
effect.
59
 
On the other hand, damages that are quantified by the wrongdoer’s profit should be viewed 
as compensatory damages just as damages quantified by any other measure.
 
A true 
disgorgement remedy differs from using the profit that the wrongdoer obtains in the 
quantification of damages. When profits are used in the quantification of damages, the 
afflicted party is not entitled to the profit as such, but the profit is used as a measurement 
of the loss. In these cases, the promisee has to justify why the promisor’s profit reflects its 
own loss. This is not the case with regard to a pure disgorgement remedy.
60
 
The outlook on disgorgement damages in contract law has been subject to discussion and 
controversy in common law countries in the last decades.
61
 Traditionally, disgorgement 
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damages have not been available for a breach of contract. However, this approach was 
altered by Attorney General v. Blake, where disgorgement was granted to remedy breach 
of contract.
 
The facts of the case were atypically colourful.
62
 George Blake was a member 
of the British security and intelligence services when he became an agent for the Soviet 
Union, providing information to the USSR. Blake later drafted an autobiography where he 
described his life as a double agent. Blake concluded a publishing contract entitling him to 
a signing bonus and further instalments of upon the delivery and publication of the work.
63
 
The House of Lords found that Blake’s divulging information regarding his career as a spy 
violated his employment contract with the Crown. However, the Crown was not able to 
establish that it had incurred compensable loss, and therefore Blake was not ordered to pay 
compensatory damages. However, the Attorney General was successful in the claim for the 
gains that Blake had received for the work.
64
 
Blake’s moral culpability and bad faith influenced the decision to exceptionally strip the 
profits made by a mere breach of contract.
65
 In general, academics have suggested that the 
reprehensibility or opportunism of the breach of contract should trigger the aggrieved 
party’s right to disgorge the ill-gotten profits. The reason behind this contention is the 
inadequacy of mere compensatory damages. The inadequacy can be seen as following 
firstly from the immoral nature of the breach, and secondly from the aggrieved party’s 
interest in performance, which, for instance, was not a mere economic interest in the Blake 
case.
66
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To conclude the brief introduction of the concept of disgorgement, the terminology in the 
area is varied. Furthermore, while a disgorgement remedy is not generally available for all 
kinds of actions, a claim for disgorgement often presupposes moral reprehensibility on part 
of the breaching party, or a wrong of a particular nature. The final point illustrates the fact 
that disgorgement is not necessarily compatible with the CISG, as the scope of application 
of the Convention merely extends to the sale of goods – facts such as in the Blake case are 
difficult to happen imagine in a CISG context.
67
 
2.2. Context for disgorgement 
In this Subchapter, I provide context as to how disgorgement appears in light of the 
theories of corrective justice and law and economics. The following analysis is not useful 
for determining the normative content of the CISG, but rather for understanding the 
philosophical and practical background of a legal institution – in this case, the 
disgorgement of profits. Theories of corrective justice and law and economics are 
analytical tools that help reviewing and developing law.
68
 While the ideas of corrective 
justice and economic analysis of law tend to support certain legal conclusions, neither 
theory is a source of binding legal rules.
69
 
2.2.1.  Disgorgement and corrective justice theory 
In this Subsection, I will first introduce the basic elements of the corrective justice theory. 
Corrective justice theory describes the philosophical fundaments of private law, and I am 
only able to gloss over the most relevant parts of it for the purposes of examining 
disgorgement.
70
 Subsequently, I will move on to describe the attempts to fit disgorgement 
into the mould of the theory. Disgorgement does not appear to easily chime with the ideals 
of the corrective justice theory, and the reconciliation process reaches a high level of 
abstraction. 
The basic tenet of the corrective justice theory is that legal remedies are meant to correct 
an injustice that the claimant has suffered, but nothing more. In other words, remedies and 
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rectification should entail undoing the injustice that the defendant has committed.
71
 The 
theory views a wrong as the defendant’s act, omission or possession of something that is 
inconsistent with the claimant’s right. The claimant’s right mirrors the defendant’s duty, 
which means in a contract law setting that the promisor’s duty is the promisee’s right.72 
It follows from the rectification ideal that the legal remedy should reflect the structure and 
content of the wrong, whereas other aspects are irrelevant. In the words of Aristotle, ‘it 
does not matter if a decent person has taken from a base person, or a base person from a 
decent person.... Rather, the law ooks only at differences in the harm [inflicted], and treats 
the people involved as equals [---]’.73 According to the corrective justice theory, policy 
reasons or other societal objectives should not be used as grounds for developing legal 
remedies.
74
 
According to corrective justice theory, the failure to comply with a contractual term 
constitutes a wrong, and the appropriate contractual remedy should reflect the structure and 
content of the breach.
75
 Traditional contractual damages in the amount of the expectation 
interest have been seen to conflict with the corrective justice theory. This is because 
expectation damages include ’compensation’ for something that the promisee concretely 
did not have before the breach of contract.
 76
 
As for the disgorgement of profits, main question in the review of whether a remedy 
follows the ideals of the theory of corrective justice is whether the remedy undoes an 
injustice that the promisee has suffered due to the promisor’s actions or omissions. In a 
claim for disgorgement, the promisor’s gain is not a mirror image of the loss suffered by 
the promisee. Thus, awarding the promisor’s gain to the promisee does not seem undo the 
effects of the breach from the point of view of the aggrieved party.
77
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Despite the foregoing, prof. Weinrib has suggested a way to bend the corrective justice 
theory into being in line with disgorgement. He contends that corrective justice should be 
viewed as concerning normative gains and losses instead of factual ones. By normative 
gains and losses, Weinrib refers to what the parties should have gained or lost under a 
Kantian regime. Kant approaches an individual’s duties as only following from the need to 
respect other individuals’ right to freedom. 78 
By way of example, to describe a hypothetical where a party suffers normative loss but no 
factual loss, Weinrib mentions the case of trespassing in private property without 
damaging the area. In contrast, factual loss without normative loss is present in a 
hypothetical where an injury has been inflicted without fault. Similarly, a normative gain 
(but no factual gain) appears in case of negligent injury. The opposite of this hypothetical 
is factual gain and lack of normative gain, e.g. in case where an individual accidentally 
paves the wrong driveway with expensive tiles.
79
  
From the perspective of normative gains and losses instead of factual ones, disgorgement 
fulfils the mirror image requirement. The normative gain obtained by the breaching party 
reflects the normative loss suffered by the aggrieved party, and thus follows the corrective 
justice theory.
80
  
An alternative way to reconcile the concept of disgorgement with the corrective justice 
theory has been to characterise contractual entitlement as a piece of property. Following 
this reasoning, the breach of contract means that the promisor makes use of the piece of the 
property that belongs to the promisee.  Following from this, the profit arising out of the 
breach can also be seen as profit that the piece of property generates. In this, the effects of 
the wrong include the fact that the profit generated by the piece of property is wrongly 
allocated to the breaching promisor. This way to characterise a breach of contract is not 
far-fetched in a hypothetical where the seller sells a unique object of sale to a third party 
instead of the promisee.
81
 
While disgorgement fits into the mould of the corrective justice theory with difficulty, this 
has practical relevance if one adheres to the premises of the theory. Namely, this refers to 
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the idea that legal remedies are meant to correct an injustice that the claimant has suffered, 
and not more. If one considers that contractual remedies serve other purposes, the theory 
amounts to an intellectual exercise. 
2.2.2.  Disgorgement according to law and economics 
Theories of corrective justice and economic analysis of law can be seen as each other’s 
counter parts.
82
 In contrast to corrective justice theories that reject the usefulness of taking 
into account policy perspectives, law and economics is one of the sciences of policy. The 
economic analysis of law explores the effects of regulation on behaviour, reviewing legal 
norms with an economic approach.
83
 
Law and economics focuses on the effects of regulation and analyses whether law operates 
optimally.
84
 The economic analysis of law strives for an efficient society. ‘Efficiency’ in 
this context commonly refers to the total wealth created by different ways of allocating 
resources.
85
 According to the economic analysis of law, regulation should encourage an 
optimal use of resources.
86
 
In view of the foregoing, law and economics does not classify actions or omissions as 
wrongs or injustice. By contrast, the movement observes the economic consequences of 
such actions or omissions. Furthermore, law and economics measures the effects and 
incentives created by law in monetary terms, and views sanctions and remedies as prices.
87
 
Law and economics reviews legal rules in light of whether they reach a certain end, which 
is typically the maximisation of wealth.
88
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Law and economics defines a contract as a bargain consisting of promises.
89
 Enabling 
contracting increases economic efficiency because contracts allow individuals to allocate 
resources to the use that generates the highest value.
90
 The reason why contract law 
remedies are considered to have an effect on the optimal allocation of resources is that the 
remedies influence the risks and rewards of contracting. Therefore, rational parties are 
likely to have regard to the remedies during negotiations and when assessing the 
profitability of a contract.
91
 
Disgorgement is an institution that can be subject to an economic analysis from different 
viewpoints. One of the more prominent ones is the efficient breach theory that questions 
the advantages of a disgorgement remedy in contract law.
92
 An efficient breach
93
 refers to 
a hypothetical where the breach yields a positive return to the breaching party even after 
the aggrieved party has been compensated fully and other possible costs of the breach have 
been paid.  
Economists maintain that such a breach of contract should be encouraged because it leaves 
neither of the contracting parties economically worse off than if the contract had been 
fulfilled.
94
 In other words, the breach is a Pareto improvement because one of the parties is 
better off, while neither party is left worse off.
95
 Following this line of reasoning, 
disgorgement damages are inefficient because the institution prevents an efficient breach. 
Disgorgement damages encourage the promisor to allocate the resources that are needed to 
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perform the contract (‘performance resources’) to fulfilling the contractual obligation 
instead of using them to a more profitable use.
96
  
From another an economical point of view, unenforceable contracts are not efficient. If the 
legal system does not enforce contracts, the parties themselves have to incur extra costs to 
ensure the fulfilment of the contract. In addition, if buyers cannot trust in the seller 
fulfilling their promise, the buyers may choose to engage in a less favourable trade, leading 
to a suboptimal result.
97
 Having effective remedies to ensure enforceability and deter 
breach of contract promotes efficiency in this sense. Disgorgement is an effective remedy 
in the sense that it eliminates the incentive to breach a contract. Moreover, the promisor 
who is provided with an opportunity to use the performance resources more profitably can 
attempt to negotiate with the promisee to delay delivery or to be released from the 
contractual undertaking. Thus, a disgorgement remedy does not necessarily prevent the 
reallocation of performance resources in a more efficient way.
98
 
It has also been argued that granting disgorgement damages requires ‘formidable 
transaction costs’. These costs are attributable to the calculation of the benefits that the 
breach has generated, and the determination of whether the breach caused the benefit. It 
supposedly follows from these procedural costs that disgorgement is an inefficient 
remedy.
99
 While it is true that it is not always simple to calculate an exact amount or 
determine whether a causal link exists between a benefit and the breach, the same hurdle 
can be associated with several other contract law remedies, such as compensatory damages 
or price reduction. There does not seem to be a reason to attribute such procedural costs 
with disgorgement damages any more strongly than other remedies. Hence, the transaction 
costs should not be taken into account in the assessment of disgorgement damages in 
relation to other contractual remedies. 
To conclude, the efficient breach theory is a controversial topic.
100
 In essence, the theory 
views disgorgement damages as discouraging the promisor from allocating performance 
resources to a more efficient use. It follows that disgorgement cannot be described as an 
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optimal remedy from an economical perspective.
101
 However, the fact that disgorgement 
effectively discourages breach of contract may increase trust in potential contracting 
parties and hence lead to a buyer choosing the optimal seller.
102
 Lastly, awarding 
disgorgement damages may in some cases entail significant procedural costs, but these 
seem to be inherent in different kinds of contractual remedies, such as compensatory 
damages.
103
 
 
3. SETTING THE FRAMEWORK: INTRODUCING CISG 
Having previously introduced the notion of disgorgement, in this Chapter, I describe the 
characteristics and provisions of the Convention that are relevant for the interplay between 
the remedy and the CISG. I will first introduce the interpretative tools that allow to go 
beyond the wording of the Convention, namely interpretation according to the general 
principles of the CISG and gap-filling. Furthermore, I will discuss the possible legal bases 
for a claim for disgorgement in the CISG, Articles 74 and 84(2) CISG. Finally, I will 
review the measures of the compensatory damages that are available under the CISG. 
3.1. Use of general principles in gap-filling and interpretation 
In this Subchapter, I focus on the role of general principles in the interpretation and gap-
filling under the CISG. Before introducing gap-filling or interpretation, I will first justify 
the attention that I give to the principles underlying the CISG in this Subsection. The role 
of the principles is essential to disgorgement, as the principles are the sole important factor 
speaking for granting disgorgement under the Convention.
104
 Therefore, responding to the 
questions of how and why general principles affect the interpretation of the CISG is a focal 
point in the analysis of disgorgement under the Convention.  
Interpretation and gap-filling are methods that enable resolving legal questions. In broad 
terms, gap-filling settles legal questions where the text of the CISG is silent, while 
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interpretation comes to question where the content of a provision is unclear.
105
 The line 
between interpretation and gap-filling is not clear, and not all authors even distinguish 
between the concepts.
106
 However, distinguishing between them is important due to the 
diverging rules concerning the methodological approaches. As will be discussed in the 
following Subchapter, it bears practical relevance if gap-filling principles are applicable to 
the question of whether the CISG provides for disgorgement or not.  
General principles are relevant to both tools, even though the significance of the general 
principles is only mentioned explicitly in terms of gap-filling in the text of the 
Convention.
107
 Applying the general principles is a type of systematic interpretation. In 
other words, reviewing a legal question together with the relevant general principles is a 
way to observe a provision in the entirety of the Convention.
108
  
There are several aspects that support the conclusion that the general principles play a role 
in the interpretation in addition to gap-filling. Firstly, there does not appear to be a reason 
to apply the general principles in gap-filling but not in the ‘mere’ interpretation of an 
article.
109
 It would be contradictory to allow the interpreter discretion in relation to gap-
filling, but then restrict interpretation to a formalistic textual analysis.
110
 This holds true 
especially where it is not easy to draw a line between gap-filling and interpretation.
111
 
Secondly, interpretation in accordance with general principles allows the CISG to adjust to 
changes in the society in accordance with its purpose to promote international trade. 
International treaties should not be disconnected of the surrounding society, and 
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interpretation according to the general principles provides necessary flexibility for the 
interpretation.
112
 
Moving on from interpretation to gap-filling, Article 7(2) CISG provides that matters that 
are not expressly settled by the wording of the Convention should be resolved in 
conformity with the general principles underlying the CISG. If general principles that 
resolve the issue do not exist or cannot be discerned, the interpreter may turn to domestic 
law.
113
 As regards this second step of the gap-filling mechanism, Bonell has asserted that 
‘courts should to the largest possible extent refrain from resorting to the different domestic 
laws and try to find a solution within the Convention itself’.114 
To concretise the gap-filling mechanism with an example, the question of who bears the 
burden of proof regarding damages is resolved as follows: Firstly, an interpreter should 
define whether the question is governed by the CISG, as a gap may only exist with regard 
to an issue that is. The question of who bears the burden of proof is in the scope of the 
CISG, as Article 79 CISG explicitly sets forth a norm on the allocation of the burden. 
Secondly, the interpreter should apply the general principles underlying the Convention 
that determine how the issue should be resolved.
 115
 For burden of proof, the relevant 
general principles are the reasonability standard and the policy that the breaching party 
should not escape liability if the breaching party's wrongful act causes the difficulty in 
proving damages with certainty. Based on a weighing of these principles, it follows that the 
aggrieved party bears the burden of showing that it incurred loss with reasonable 
certainty.
116
 
With regard to gap-filling, certain soft laws, especially the PICC 2010 and the PECL, have 
been suggested as material to be used in gap-filling.
117
 The use of such principles as gap-
filling has been most frequent in arbitral awards. The rationale is that the mentioned rules 
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in the soft law instruments are similar, but often more comprehensive than the 
corresponding norms under the CISG.
118
 In addition, the PICC 2010, the PECL and the 
CISG share a common objective – the promotion of international trade. Both the PICC 
2010 and the PECL are silent on disgorgement, only providing for traditional 
compensatory damages. Thus, neither collection of norms is useful for the purposes of this 
work. 
This Subchapter has referred to the ‘general principles under the CISG’ in general terms 
time and time again without specifying what those principles are. The CISG does not list 
the general principles underlying it, but the interpreter is supposed to read between the 
lines.
119
 To name some of the principles, the principle of good faith can function as a gap-
filling principle in addition to its role under Article 7(1) CISG.
120
 Secondly, the full 
compensation of the aggrieved party has been considered to constitute a principle. Finally, 
another principle that may be relevant in terms of disgorgement is the principle of 
preservation of contract (favor contractus).
121
 The general principles that are relevant for 
disgorgement are examined in depth in Chapter 5. 
3.2. Possible legal bases for disgorgement in the CISG  
This Subchapter describes how disgorgement appears in the context of the CISG on a 
general level. Arguably the most natural legal basis for granting disgorgement under the 
CISG would be Article 74, which is the basic provision setting out the extent of damages 
that the aggrieved party is entitled to.
122
 Based on Article 74 CISG, the breaching party is 
liable to pay compensatory damages to the aggrieved party. 
In addition to Article 74 CISG, prof. Hillman has proposed Article 84(2) CISG as legal 
grounds for disgorgement. Article 84(2) CISG provides that if a contract is avoided after 
the buyer has received the object of sale, the goods are returned, and the seller is entitled to 
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any benefits that the buyer has derived from the goods. Basing his argument on an 
analogical application of this Article, Hillman has concluded that the aggrieved party 
should be entitled to the disgorgement of ‘any benefit’ that a breaching party has derived 
from breach of contract.
123
 In other words, Hillman claims that an article setting out the 
legal effects of an avoidance could be used as legal grounds for an alternative remedy, 
disgorgement. 
To introduce Hillman’s entire line of reasoning, he suggests that allowing the breaching 
party to benefit from the breach of contract would be inconsistent with the principles under 
the Convention. Therefore, following from the principle that gaps should be filled in 
accordance with the principles underlying the Convention, the CISG should be viewed as 
providing for the disgorgement of profits. Among such ‘principles underlying the 
Convention’, Hillman mentions encouraging to the completion of contracts, the promotion 
of trust and cooperation, supporting planning, and reducing transaction costs.
124
 
As the principles underlying the Convention are relevant for the interpretation of 
provisions as well as gap-filling, interpreting the Article 74 CISG as allowing for a claim 
for disgorgement could be justified with similar arguments as the ideas that Hillman has 
put forward. It is worth noting that there is only scarce legal literature analysing 
disgorgement in connection with Article 84(2) CISG. 
Interpreting Article 84(2) CISG as providing for a disgorgement remedy appears to be far-
fetched to say the least. The article concerns the effects of avoidance for the benefit of the 
seller. An interpretation that the provision allows for a claim for disgorgement requires 
stretching it to concern remedies for breach of contract, and benefit either party. It seems to 
be less of a stretch to consider Article 74 CISG in connection with disgorgement.
125
 
A final technical point as regards Hillman’s reasoning concerns the question of whether the 
availability of a disgorgement remedy constitutes a gap. As stated in the previous 
Subchapter, ‘gaps’ are issues that the CISG does not expressly resolve, but that the CISG 
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governs.
126
 The system of remedies under the CISG is exhaustive, and hence it is 
problematic to propose that the lack of explicit mention of a remedy constitutes a gap.
127
 If 
disgorgement were a gap, it would follow that any remedy that is not explicitly mentioned 
in the text could be viewed as gaps as well.  
Another problematic feature of declaring that disgorgement is a gap is the second step of 
the gap-filling mechanism. If the availability of disgorgement was be left to be resolved by 
the applicable domestic law, disgorgement would be available in some jurisdictions, but 
not available in others, even if CISG were the law governing the contract. Playing with the 
thought, it could theoretically follow that any remedy that is available under a domestic 
law could be granted for a breach of a CISG contract. If disgorgement represents a gap, 
would nominal damages or a judicial penalty be a gap as well, as the CISG does not deny 
them either? If so, the availability of any contractual remedy would then be resolved by the 
general principles of the CISG or, failing that, domestic law. The divergence of available 
remedies under a uniform sales law would be unacceptable, especially so as the remedies 
for breach of contract bear special importance in the context of a sales law.
128
  
An appropriate interpretation would be to conclude that disgorgement is not a gap, as 
Article 74 CISG settles the extent of the monetary remedies that the aggrieved party is 
entitled to.
129
 Therefore, the issue should be considered as settled by the CISG, with the 
evident note that Article 74 CISG must be interpreted in this respect.  
Although the availability of disgorgement should not be viewed as a gap in the 
Convention, disgorgement could at least theoretically be provided for by Article 74 CISG 
pursuant to interpretation. In any event, the general principles are relevant in the issue 
because principles can be used in the interpretation of the text of the CISG, and not only 
gap-filling.
130
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3.3. Different measures of damages generally and under the CISG 
In view of the discussion in the two previous Subchapters, the availability of disgorgement 
under the CISG should be determined on the basis of the interpretation of Article 74 CISG. 
This Subchapter introduces the basic elements regarding the liability for damages under the 
CISG under the Article. The relevance of this Subsection is to explain the conventional 
approach to damages under the CISG. In the end of the Subsection, I discuss the objectives 
of CISG damages on one hand and disgorgement on the other, addressing the question of 
how Article 74 CISG relates to the penal elements involved in disgorgement. 
The basics of the damages provisions under the CISG are simple. The buyer and the 
seller’s liability are mirror images: the breach of any obligation under the contract or the 
CISG triggers the aggrieved party’s right to damages.131 Hence, a party is entitled to 
damages for a breach of the obligation to pay the contractual price just as well as the 
confidentiality clause.  
Article 74 CISG provides that the aggrieved party is entitled to a ‘sum equal to the loss, 
including loss of profit, suffered [---] as a consequence of the breach’. The norm reflects 
the principle of full compensation, entailing that the promisee is entitled to compensation 
for any disadvantage caused by the breach.
132
 The recoverability of type of loss does not 
depend on whether the loss is classified as direct, indirect, consequential, incidental, etc.
133
  
Even if classifications are irrelevant for the recoverability of loss, theoretical descriptions 
may aid in understanding damages. According to a traditional classification of contract 
law, the notions of expectation interest and reliance interest describe the measures of 
contractual damages.
134
 Reliance interest denotes the value of the actions that the promisee 
has taken because of reliance in the contract. The purpose of reliance damages is to undo 
the harm that the reliance on the contract has caused to the promisee.
135
 Expectation 
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interest refers to the value to the promisee of the performance that he was due to receive 
under the contract but did not.
136
 Thus, damages can be described as being, so far as 
possible, a pecuniary equivalent to the contractual entitlement.
137
  
The aggrieved party is entitled to damages irrespective of the fault (or lack thereof) on 
behalf of the breaching party. In other words, the negligence or wilfulness of the breaching 
party is irrelevant as regards the damages under the CISG.
138
 The CISG reflects control 
liability. If the breach is due to an impediment beyond control, liability for damages does 
not arise.
139
 
The right to full compensation is limited by the aggrieved party’s duty to mitigate loss and 
the doctrine of foreseeability. The duty to mitigate refers to the responsibility to take any 
reasonable measures to mitigate loss that a breach of contract causes.
140
 Failure to mitigate 
precludes the aggrieved party from claiming compensation for damage that could 
reasonably have been avoided.
141
   
The requirement of foreseeability means that the breaching party is not liable to 
compensate damage that it could not foresee, or ought not to have foreseen, as a possible 
result of a breach.
142
 The exact amount of the loss need not be foreseeable, but the 
foreseeability requirement refers to the type and the extent of the loss.
143
 Foreseeability is 
assessed at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
144
  
In contrast to full compensation of loss, punitive damages are sums awarded in excess of 
the loss suffered by the aggrieved party (also referred to as ‘overcompensation’).145 As the 
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term describes, the aims of the excess award include punishing the breaching party and 
deterring breach of contract.
146
 A slightly different definition is that punitive damages are a 
granted in an amount that is independent of the extent of loss.
147
 The latter definition does 
not require that the amount of damages exceeds the amount of loss, but rather that the 
awarded amount is determined by other means than by reference to the loss. 
Disgorgement of profits bears a punitive element in the sense that the remedy may yield a 
windfall profit to the promisee.
148
 This is probably the element that troubles most lawyers 
that are reluctant to approve disgorgement. Despite the punitive colour that disgorgement 
bears, I do not use the term ‘punitive damages’ as encompassing disgorgement damages 
for the sake of the clarity of the terminology of this work.  
A black and white view of the objectives of punishment and compensation is not 
necessarily accurate. For instance, Fuller and Perdue challenge the notion that damages in 
the amount of expectation interest have a merely compensatory nature, arguing that the 
expectation interest includes ‘compensation’ for something that the promisee never had.149 
Fuller and Perdue maintain that expectation damages may also be considered as penalising 
the promisor for the breach of contract.
150
 
Fuller and Perdue’s reasoning, however arguable their conclusion may be, shows why 
demarcations for certain types of remedies, such as ‘punitive’, are mere descriptions that 
should not in themselves carry legal significance. In other words, the fact that a remedy is 
punitive should not per se mean that it does not conform with a law, e.g. the CISG. The 
availability of disgorgement under the Convention should rather be determined on the basis 
of an interpretation of Article 74 CISG.
151
 
In this Chapter, I first discussed the role of the principles underlying the CISG. The 
principles are essential in the discussion concerning disgorgement, as the principles are the 
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sole important factor speaking for granting disgorgement under the Convention. 
Subsequently, I introduced the basic methodological differences of gap-filling and 
interpretation, concluding that gap-filling does not come to question with respect to 
disgorgement. This is because disgorgement is not a gap, as Article 74 CISG settles the 
extent of the monetary remedies that the aggrieved party is entitled to. Furthermore, I 
argued that while Article 74 CISG provides for the compensation of the aggrieved party’s 
expectation and reliance interests, which can be described as compensatory remedies, the 
term ‘compensatory’ is a mere description without legal relevance. The penal element that 
disgorgement bears is not per se a hindrance to Article 74 CISG being interpreted as 
providing for disgorgement. 
 
4. DOMESTIC TRENDS IN INTERPETATION OF CISG 
In the previous Chapter, I focused on introducing the characteristics of the CISG that are 
the most important for an analysis of disgorgement. I will now turn to examine the 
interpretation of the CISG in more depth. In this Chapter, I turn to the first research 
question of whether a domestic contract law development to expand the availability of 
disgorgement damages should be taken into account in the interpretation of the 
Convention. 
’Interpretation is an art, not a science’.152 This famous statement underlines the flexible 
nature of interpretation. However, there are frames to the artwork, i.e. the rules that guide 
interpretation.
153
 In this Chapter, I will first describe the norms guiding the interpretation 
of the CISG. Subsequently, I will turn to discuss whether a pro-disgorgement trend truly 
exists. Finally, I will observe the relation between the principle of uniform application and 
possible the pro-disgorgement trend.  
4.1. Interpretation of the CISG in general  
In this Subchapter, I will first introduce the legal sources applicable to the interpretation of 
the Convention. Then, I will move on to examine the general objectives and principles that 
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guide the interpretation of the Convention. Finally, I will describe the concrete tools that 
can be used in interpreting the CISG. The description of the basic structure of the 
interpretation of the CISG will aid in understanding the effect that the domestic legal 
influences can, or cannot, have on the Convention.  
To clarify the source of the legal norms that govern the interpretation of the Convention, 
the interpretative methods and principles expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT) are not applicable to the CISG.
154
 The underlying reason is that the 
VCLT regime is designed to apply to the obligations of contracting states, while the CISG 
is more often interpreted in the realm of a commercial relationship between private 
parties.
155
 The CISG autonomously sets forth the applicable rules of interpretation in 
Article 7 CISG.  
Article 7(1) CISG sets forth the objectives and principles of the interpretation, although the 
CISG does not otherwise concretely specify the methods of interpretation that are 
available.
156
 The provision provides for three main directives to be followed in 
interpretation: the need to take into account the international character of the norms, the 
aim of promoting uniformity in the application of the Convention, and the goal to promote 
good faith in international trade.
157
 These should rather be described as objectives rather 
than methods of interpretation, as they do not offer tools for the interpreter. 
The references to the international character and the principle of uniform application are 
intertwined. ‘International character’ refers to the idea of an autonomous interpretation of 
terms, i.e. that the terms used in the Convention should be understood in CISG terms, 
independently of any domestic preconception. Courts and tribunals should not assume that 
‘good faith’ under the CISG is the same as ‘bonne foi’ in the French legal system.158 On 
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the other hand, the principle of uniform application is a broader idea, entailing that the 
CISG should be interpreted uniformly in different jurisdictions.
159
 The interpreter should 
not read the Convention through the lenses of domestic law, but taking into account how 
courts and tribunals elsewhere have interpreted the same provision.
160
  
Uniformity and consistency of application is more likely to be achieved if lawyers in 
different jurisdictions use the same interpretative tools and give them equal weight. 
Different interpretative methodologies are emphasised in different legal families.
161
 For 
example, the importance of legislative history varies in different CISG contracting states. 
In civil law countries, preparative works are typically relied on in interpretation. By 
contrast, common law countries place more importance on the literal meaning of a legal 
text.
162
 The interpretation of the CISG should represent a certain balance between different 
legal cultures, just as the substantive norms under the Convention.
163
 
Under Article 7(1) CISG, ‘the observance of good faith’ is the third guiding philosophy in 
the interpretation of the CISG. In terms of good faith, it is important to distinguish between 
the principle of good faith as a method of interpretation and the good faith obligation of the 
contracting parties. This study only addresses good faith as a principle that guides the 
interpretation of the CISG. It is controversial whether the CISG imposes a duty of good 
faith on the parties,
164
 and examining the question is not relevant for the scope of this 
study. 
The meaning of what the principle of good faith under Article 7(1) CISG requires is 
unclear.
165
 ‘Good faith’ has diverging meanings in domestic laws. Under the Convention, 
‘the observance of good faith in international trade’ has been put into practice by 
interpreting the CISG provisions as forbidding the deliberate pursuit of self-interest, 
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deliberate exploitation of dominance over others and dishonest behaviour.
166
 In addition, 
certain articles of the Convention have been described as manifestations of the good faith 
principle by the Secretariat Commentary on Article 7 CISG.
167
 
Moving on to the concrete methods of interpretation, the natural starting point is the 
wording of the text.
168
 Certain authors assert that where the formulation of the Convention 
is unequivocal, further interpretative tools are not needed.
169
 The United States federal 
Appellate Court for the 11
th
 Circuit has also put forward that the goal of the uniform 
application of the CISG can only be achieved by interpreting and applying the plain 
language of the text.
170
 However, according to the more compelling contrary view, a strict 
literal approach may easily mislead the interpreter and thereby lead to a non-uniform 
result, even if the text is seemingly unequivocal.
171
 As noted above, CISG terms should be 
understood in the CISG context instead of the domestic definition of a notion.
172
 Domestic 
preconceptions as to legal terms may misguide the judge or the arbitrator, and thereby 
increase the homeward trend.
173
 In addition, different language versions of the Convention 
may prove problematic to uniformity.
174
  
International case law
175
, doctrine
176
 and legislative history
177
 should be taken into account 
in interpretation of the Convention. Using these methods in the interpretation of the 
Convention is necessary in light of the principle of uniform application enshrined in 
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Article 7(1) CISG. A judge’s or an arbitrator’s familiarisation with CISG preparatory 
works, doctrine and case law reduces the risk of diverging applications in different 
jurisdictions.
178
 Below, I will elaborate on each of these sources and their significance to 
the interpretation of the Convention. 
Case law is one of the principal sources of interpretation of the CISG. As one of the most 
powerful tools in achieving consistency in application, case law is a highly authoritative, 
albeit not a binding source.
179
 Furthermore, legal literature has an assisting task by 
systematising and researching the CISG and its case law. Scholarly writing also introduces 
case law from different jurisdictions, thereby advancing uniformity.
180
 Finally, legal 
literature has an important role in formulating the general principles of the Convention.
181
 
Furthermore, preparatory works can be taken into consideration in the application of the 
Convention.
182
 However, too much emphasis on legislative history may impede the natural 
development of a treaty. International treaties should not be disconnected of the 
surrounding society.
183
 In such situations, courts and tribunals slavishly following the 
original legislative intention may render the uniform law outdated.
184
 
The final question concerns the interplay of the methods of interpretation set forth above. 
No generally recognised ranking has been established in jurisprudence, which suggests that 
they may be used in a flexible order and manner. This is why interpretation is rather an art 
than an exact science. As an exception, however, the textual analysis is typically the 
starting point of interpretation, whereas other methods complement and clarify the text of 
the Convention.
185
 
To summarise the observations that I have made in this Subsection, many sources of 
guidance can be used in the interpretation of the Convention. The rules regarding 
interpretation are flexible. However, the goal of a uniform interpretation is unyielding in 
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the sense that it should always be taken into account in resolving any legal question under 
the Convention.  
4.2. The relevance of national developments to the interpretation of the 
Convention 
The research question that I discuss in this Chapter, i.e. whether domestic trends have an 
effect on the interpretation of the Convention, comprises two subquestions: Firstly, is there 
truly a tendency in national laws to expand the scope of disgorgement? Secondly, 
assuming that such tendency exists, should such a trend impact the approach taken by the 
CISG? 
In this Subchapter, I will first shed light on whether and where the national trend towards 
expanding the scope of disgorgement damages is discernible. After this, I examine whether 
the principle of uniform application allows to take into account the observed extent of the 
trend. In order to answer this question, I will analyse the principle of uniform application, 
determining whether it constitutes an absolute prohibition of all national influences, or 
rather a guideline for attaining a functioning international sales law. Finally, I will explore 
if and what kind of reasons justify a dynamic interpretation that collides with the wording 
of the treaty, arguing that a change in the approach of a treaty is more warranted due to 
changes in circumstances rather than values. 
4.2.1. Pro-disgorgement trend 
As mentioned before, prof. Schwenzer argues that domestic developments should play a 
role in the interpretation of the Convention. In connection with this statement, she 
mentions the developments in Dutch law, English law, Canadian law and German law.
186
 
Taking into account that there are currently 85 contracting states of the CISG, the observed 
trend does not represent the larger part of the CISG nations.
187
  
Due to the unavoidable vagueness of the review in this Subchapter, it is not imperative to 
define which countries are considered relevant as regards the pro-disgorgement trend. 
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Answering this question would not be straightforward, as countries that have not 
implemented the CISG may nonetheless come to apply the Convention, for instance 
through an application of private international law rules. Thus, the developments in 
potentially all countries of the world (with the possible exception of North Korea and other 
such countries that do not participate in international trade) may arguably be considered 
relevant for the CISG. This point illustrates the difficulties that are embodied in the 
statement that domestic law developments should affect the interpretation of the CISG.  
Before turning to the analysis, it is relevant to note the challenge involved in the task of 
defining whether a certain trend is visible in the national laws around the world. It is 
practically impossible to give a conclusive answer of where a development to expand the 
scope of disgorgement exists in all domestic contract laws that are relevant for the CISG. 
In this Subchapter, I am forced to rely on individual articles drafted by individual scholars, 
without being able to critically evaluate the conclusions of these sources due to the lack of 
knowledge on the different legal systems. Hence, this Subchapter represents a mere scratch 
on the topic. 
Fortunately the recent developments of the disgorgement institutions have been subject to 
legal comparative research, as disgorgement in private law was the theme of the XIXth 
congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law in 2014. In connection with 
the congress, Hondius and Janssen collected 24 national reports on disgorgement, each 
drafted by a local scholar. While the extent of this considerable comparative project does 
not cover even half of the contracting states of the CISG, it comprises a variety of legal 
traditions. The participating countries included Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, France, 
Germany, Israel, Japan, Norway, Slovenia and South Africa. The national reports observed 
the disgorgement institution under several branches of private law, and not only contract 
law.
188
  
In summarising the reports’ analysis of the future of the remedy, Hondius and Janssen 
conclude that majority of the reporters had a positive attitude towards creating or 
expanding disgorgement damages as a self-standing remedy. In addition, several reporters 
wished for a stricter approach to skimming off illicit profits.
189
 Hondius and Janssen 
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observe that the scope of application and requirements of granting disgorgement damages 
vary greatly between different national systems. However, no such development was 
observed in several other jurisdictions. Disgorgement was even seen as being against the 
contract law culture in some countries.
190
  
Furthermore, what may have impacted the responses of the national reporters, the original 
questionnaire was formulated in a way that strongly favours disgorgement. For example, 
the questionnaire began with a reflection of whether ‘tort pays’. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire requested an analysis of whether each national system was efficient in 
skimming off ‘illegal profits’.191 As described in the beginning of this study, it is not 
evident that profit obtained due to breach of contract should be considered illegal in a 
normative sense, instead of perceiving it neutrally as the price of breaching a contract.
192
  
Based on the collection of reports drafted by Hondius and Janssen, it appears that there is a 
tendency towards developing disgorgement damages in some domestic laws, or at least a 
scholarly wish for such a development.
193
 However, the development was not observed in 
all reports, or even half of them. The fact that the development of disgorgement damages 
does not encompass all CISG countries is relevant for the second question relating to 
Schwenzer’s argument, as will be observed below. The second question was whether such 
possible national developments should affect the interpretation of the CISG.  
4.2.2. Uniformity and modernisation of treaties 
In the context of the principle of uniform application, the traits of national law amount to a 
curse word. The importance of uniformity in the application of an international convention 
is famously described by Viscount Simonds as follows: ‘It would be deplorable if the 
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nations should, after protracted negotiations, reach agreement [...] and that their several 
courts should then disagree as to the meaning of what they appeared to agree upon’.194 
While the status of the principle of uniform application is undisputed under the CISG, its 
exact content is less clear. The approaches to the principle can be distinguished as ‘strict 
uniformity’ and ‘functional uniformity’.195 Strict uniformity involves the idea that all 
provisions under the CISG should be interpreted exactly the same way as they are in other 
nations applying the CISG. Following the strict approach, no domestic influence can be 
brought to the Convention, rejecting the idea of interpreting the CISG in light of national 
developments.
196
 By contrast, the ideal of functional uniformity accepts that an absolute 
unification of rules is an impossible task. Functionalists aim at achieving a manageable 
level of uniformity that decreases impediments to international sales, however eliminating 
uncertainty as to the normative content of CISG provisions.
197
 
The wording of Article 7 CISG leans towards the notion of functional uniformity. Firstly, 
the provision states that ‘regard has to be had to the international character’, instead of 
e.g. ‘provisions must be interpreted in accordance with the international character 
thereof’. The formulation can be interpreted to imply that the drafters did not intend to 
impose an absolute standard. Secondly, the article refers to the ‘need to promote uniformity 
in its application’ (emphasis here), instead of using a stronger expression.198 
In any sense of the concept of uniformity, reaching a unified interpretation is difficult if all 
national developments are given weight in the interpretation of the Convention. Courts in 
various jurisdictions may have a greatly diverging view of a trend in law. In addition, it 
may be overtly demanding to require that a court or a tribunal is aware of international 
developments. This holds true especially if a certain development happens to not affect the 
part of the world where the court or tribunal is seated.
199
 
On the other hand, prof. Schwenzer has argued that giving way to national developments in 
fact increases uniformity, instead of undermining it. According to her line of reasoning, the 
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national trends that favour disgorgement damages lead to courts and tribunals resorting to 
domestic laws in addition to the CISG, if they find the remedies under the Convention 
unsatisfactory.
200
 Schwenzer’s position can be described as realistic, even pessimistic. In 
essence, she argues that courts and tribunals will not apply norms that significantly differ 
from their national laws, and hence the CISG should develop to better reflect domestic 
laws. 
However, in 85 national laws, there is no such thing as a single trend. As noted above, 
development to expand the scope of disgorgement damages cannot be discerned all over 
the world.
201
 As was the case during the drafting of the contracting states of the CISG, 
many states still frown upon granting overcompensation to remedy breach of contract, and 
scorn the thought of deterrence as a goal of contractual remedies.
202
 While the adoption of 
disgorgement into the Convention by way of interpretation may increase a positive attitude 
towards the CISG in some countries, but the same move is likely to have the opposite 
effect in others. 
From the perspective of retaining the importance of an aging treaty, how does a convention 
‘stay connected with the surrounding society’ if national law influences are considered as 
nothing more than a menace?
203
 Treaties become outdated rapidly if no dynamic 
interpretation is allowed.
204
 The 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (below referred to as ‘NYC’) is an example of a treaty that has 
preserved its utility partly due to the liberal interpretation as regards the written form 
requirement.
205
 Similarly, the CISG remains the leading convention on the area of 
international trade, despite having been adopted as early as in 1980, a year when Jimmy 
Carter was the president of the US and the first version of video game Pac-Man was 
lanced.
206
 Dynamic treaty interpretation allows adjusting international conventions to 
changing circumstances over time.
207
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The most successful international conventions have a high number of contracting states, 
and thus updating the text of such a convention is extremely difficult, even impossible.
208
 
The development of the modern economy and technologies yields legislation obsolete in a 
matter of years, if interpretation does not lend a hand in keeping it modern.
209
 In this 
respect, allowing national trends to influence international treaties contributes to functional 
uniformity. 
Domestic influences typically disturb the uniformity of application, and thus an effect on 
the interpretation of the CISG would have to be an exception. Hence, it would seem logical 
to require that a certain tendency could be observed in the greater part of the contracting 
states for it to bear weight in the interpretation of the CISG. This would be a way to 
manage the risk that the domestic tendency leads to the fragmentation of the interpretation 
of the Convention. 
In addition to taking into account the risk of fragmented application, one should also 
review the justification of changing interpretations. Dynamic interpretation seems most 
justifiable in cases where the need for interpretation is due to developed technologies or 
other change of circumstances.
210
 A classic example of a question where a dynamic 
interpretation has been needed is electronic correspondence and electronic signatures. For 
instance, it has been considered that an arbitration agreement concluded via e-mail suffices 
as an agreement in writing that is contained in an exchange of ‘letters or telegrams’, as 
required by the New York Convention.
211
  
However, a tendency to favour disgorgement damages in domestic laws is a different kind 
of development. The fact that disgorgement has arisen to complement compensatory 
damages has more to do with changing values and attitudes than developed technologies or 
change of circumstances. In comparison to compensatory damages, disgorgement damages 
are a step towards a punitive remedy.  
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The reason why changing the interpretation of the CISG due to changing values is 
problematic because the CISG can be seen as a compromise of values that the contracting 
states have found.
212
 The drafters of the CISG decided not to include punitive or other 
supra-compensatory damages, even though they did exist in certain jurisdictions when the 
CISG was drafted.
213
 To commence interpreting Article 74 CISG, which provides for 
compensatory damages, as granting the right to an amount exceeding loss would seem to 
be contrary to the compromise that the contracting states have found.
214
 
To conclude the discussion on the issue, Schwenzer’s idea that the CISG should be 
interpreted in light of recent development in different domestic laws seems problematic. 
Following from the principle of autonomous interpretation of the CISG, courts and 
tribunals are not typically allowed to take domestic traits into account when applying the 
Convention.  
Moreover, achieving uniformity in application is difficult if national developments can be 
given weight in the interpretation. Only a development that is common to most of the 
contracting states could possibly be introduced in the Convention without fragmenting the 
interpretation.  In addition, a dynamic interpretation seems most justifiable in cases where 
the need for interpretation is due to developed technologies or other changing 
circumstances. By contrast, nationally changing values should not lead to a changing 
interpretation, as the CISG represents a compromise of values that the contracting states 
have agreed on. 
 
5. CISG AS GRANTING DISGORGEMENT? 
In the previous Chapters of this study, I have introduced the concept of disgorgement as 
well as the principles of the interpretation of the CISG. In this Chapter, I employ the notion 
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and the interpretative tools for the purposes of examining whether Article 74 CISG yields 
to providing for disgorgement.  
Before turning to the analysis, I will describe briefly the attitude that previous legal 
research has taken towards disgorgement in the framework of the CISG. The prevailing 
opinion is rather against the interpretation that the CISG grants an aggrieved party the right 
to disgorgement. However, as will be observed below, Schwenzer supports cautiously the 
interpretation that disgorgement of profits may be awarded under the CISG in specific 
circumstances, while Schmidt-Ahrendts is against this view. In addition, both authors refer 
to German literature on the CISG where the ‘almost unanimous opinion’ is that the 
aggrieved party is not entitled to disgorgement.
215
 
Article 74 CISG sets out the framework for the extent of damages that the aggrieved party 
is entitled to due to breach of contract.
216
 In the first Subchapter, I will observe the 
wording, the limitations to damages, and the legislative history of Article 74 CISG and 
attempt to fit disgorgement into the frame. In the second Subchapter, I will discuss the 
general principles of the CISG from the perspective of disgorgement. In the final 
Subchapter, I will introduce a case where disgorgement of profits was granted under an 
international sales law, the predecessor of the CISG (ULIS).  
5.1. Wording, limitations to damages, and the legislative history of Article 
74 CISG 
Article 74 CISG provides that the aggrieved party is entitled to a “sum equal to the loss, 
including loss of profit, suffered [---] as a consequence of the breach”. Even after the first 
glance, it is fair to conclude that the idea of disgorgement is not in line with the wording of 
Article 74 CISG.
217
 The focus of the Article is strongly on the loss that the aggrieved party 
suffers, instead of the profit that the breaching party incurs. 
However, what is less clear, the term ‘loss’ is not explicitly defined in the Article. The first 
factor to take into account in the interpretation of CISG terms is that interpreters should 
rely on the CISG-specific content of the word, instead of its domestic definition.
218
 The 
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CISG Advisory Council
219
 has noted that Article 74 CISG ‘is to be liberally construed to 
compensate an aggrieved party for all disadvantages suffered as a result of the breach’, 
the relevant definition for loss being ‘all disadvantages’.220 Moreover, it is generally 
accepted that damages should be measured so as to give the aggrieved party the benefit of 
the bargain. In other words, compensation should bring the party into the position in which 
it would have been if the contract had been duly performed.
221
  
The compensation of all disadvantages is limited by the requirements of foreseeability and 
causation. Fitting disgorgement together with these requirements poses a challenge. To 
first discuss the foreseeability doctrine, the requirement of foreseeability means that the 
breaching party is not liable to compensate damage that it could not foresee, or ought not 
to have foreseen, as a possible result of a breach.
222
 The idea behind the rule is to enable 
contracting parties to calculate the risks of a contract before concluding it. This arguably 
encourages commercial activity through protecting the contracting parties from having to 
pay for unexpected loss following a breach.
223
  
There seems to be no reason why the requirement of foreseeability should not apply 
indiscriminately to disgorgement damages, assuming that such a remedy is available under 
Article 74 CISG. However, it is unclear how the requirement applies to the breaching 
party’s profit. In any event, granting disgorgement damages should not hinder contracting 
parties’ possibility to evaluate the risks of a contract at conclusion. In other words, liability 
in an extent that exceeds what the parties could reasonably foresee at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract goes against Article 74 CISG.    
Turning to the causation, the breaching party is only liable for a loss that has a sufficient 
causal link with the breach. The central question is, when is a profit attributable to the 
breach of contract, and not, for example, the skill of the breaching party?
224
 To illustrate 
                                                 
219
 The CISG Advisory Council is a private initiative that publishes opinions on the application of the 
Convention. Even though the Council opinions are not binding, they are considered authoritative especially 
in light of the principle of uniform interpretation. See, e.g. Ingeborg Schwenzer, ‘The CISG Advisory 
Council’ (2012) 2 Nederlands Tijdschrift 46 and case Teevee Toons, Inc. & Steve Gottlieb, Inc. v. Gerhard 
Schubert, GmbH (Federal District Court for New York, United States), where the court relied on Opinion no. 
3 in its interpretation of the Convention. 
220
 CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, para 1.1. 
221
 Secretariat Commentary 1978 on Art. 70, para 3 CISG; Gotanda (n 138) 991, para 1. 
222
 Art. 74 CISG. 
223
 Saidov (n 143) 102–103. 
224
 Graham Virgo, ‘Restitutionary Remedies for Wrongs: Causation and Remoteness’ in Rickett C (ed), 
Justifying Private Law Remedies (Hart Publishing 2008) (concerning disgorgement in English law.) 
42 
 
this point: The breaching party A obtains a profit of EUR 100 as a result of breach of 
contract. A, who would otherwise not have additional money to spend, invests the profit in 
a tech start-up that happens to publish a successful mobile game where players chase 
pocket monsters. One month after the investment, the original EUR 100 has turned into 
EUR 1,000,000. Even if A would not have been able to invest in the start-up if not for the 
breach of contract,
225
 is the entire amount of EUR 1,000,000 really attributable to the 
breach of contract?  
The corresponding questions arising in the context of determining the causal link between 
the breach and loss are resolved by the doctrine of foreseeability. In other words, if the 
breach causes a loss that increases in an unexpected way, the breaching party is not liable 
for the part that exceeds the reasonably foreseeable amount.
226
 However, it is not clear 
whether foreseeability would function as a corresponding limitation to the unexpectedly 
large profit that arguably becomes subject to disgorgement.  
Causation in disgorgement damages has been discussed in national laws that provide for 
disgorgement. Arguably the doctrine developed in national legal systems would apply to 
the CISG as well if disgorgement was granted under the Convention. However, I will not 
be able to examine the question of causation in disgorgement in the CISG framework in 
depth, as the theme could be the subject of a study of its own.  
Finally, as regards the legislative history of Article 74 CISG, the history of the provision 
begins with the predecessor of the CISG, ULIS. The wording of Article 74 CISG is very 
close to that of Article 82 ULIS, with the exception that the ULIS Article did not apply if 
the contract had been avoided.
227
 There were few discussions on damages provisions 
during the preparation of the CISG.
228
 The Secretariat Commentary states, however, that 
‘the basic philosophy of the action for damages is to place the injured party in the same 
economic position he would have been in if the contract had been performed’.229 The 
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disgorgement of profits does not seem to fit inside this philosophy, unless the amount of 
profit that the breaching party gains equals to the aggrieved party’s loss.230 
To summarise the main findings of this Subsection, neither the wording nor the legislative 
history supports the conclusion that disgorgement could be claimed to remedy a breach of 
contract under the CISG. However, this alone does not lead to a conclusion as regards the 
availability of disgorgement, as other tools should be employed in the interpretation of the 
Convention in addition to the literal interpretation of the text and historical analysis.
231
 
However, there should be a relatively high threshold for adopting an interpretation that 
does not follow the wording of a provision, or even contradicts it.
232
 Furthermore, if one 
accepts that the disgorgement of profits is available under the CISG, the limitations of 
damages under Article 74 CISG will have to be accommodated to the novel interpretation. 
5.2.  Disgorgement in light of the general principles of the Convention 
As noted above, the general principles are relevant since the text of the Convention does 
not provide for disgorgement explicitly. The CISG does not list the general principles 
underlying it, but the interpreter is supposed to read between the lines.
233
 The remedial 
system and especially damages are such a central part of the Convention that there are 
numerous principles that are relevant for the disgorgement of profits. 
There is an obvious risk that interpreters from different cultures derive diverging principles 
from the Convention.
234
 During the drafting of the CISG, some delegates of contracting 
states doubted whether it was possible for the uniform law to provide or develop general 
principles. The delegates suspected that the recourse to general principles would be an 
empty phrase that domestic courts would ignore, proceeding directly to the second step of 
the gap-filling mechanism, the recourse to domestic law.
235
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5.2.1.  Full compensation 
The central issue in this Subchapter is, whether the principle of full compensation implies 
that compensation exceeding the amount of loss is not available under the Convention.
236
 
The status of the principle under the Convention is uncontested, and Article 74 CISG 
explicitly provides for full compensation.
237
  
In broad terms, the principle refers to the aggrieved party’s right to be compensated for all 
disadvantages suffered as a result of the breach of contract.
238
 However, the specifics of the 
principle are not as clear cut as its general content. ‘All disadvantages’ can be understood 
in broad terms or in a more restricted sense. For example, in German contract law, loss is 
determined by the differential theory (‘Differenzhypothese’): the losses that appear on the 
balance sheet are compensable, and any other type of loss is non-compensable. However, 
arguably the application of such a strict approach lacks legal basis under the CISG, 
especially due to the strong position of the principle of full compensation. It follows that 
some disadvantages that are not visible on the balance sheet should be deemed 
recoverable.
239
 Under the PICC 2010 and PECL, non-pecuniary damage is explicitly 
mentioned as compensable.
240
 
Without entertaining an analysis of what the expectation measure truly entails, the CISG 
Advisory Council has merely recommended that overcompensation not be awarded under 
the CISG, following the wording of Article 74 CISG. More specifically, the Council’s 
Opinion states that Article 74 CISG does not allow for awards that bring the promisee to a 
better position than it would have been had the contract been performed.
241
 
Furthermore, several factors may lead to the factual undercompensation of the non-
defaulting party. Firstly, the reality of quantifying the amount of all the disadvantages 
suffered by the promisee is rarely as straightforward as the theory. Difficulties in 
calculating damage may lead to determining the amount of damages as lower than the loss 
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actually amounts to. Secondly, the damage that is unforeseeable to the breaching party is 
not compensable pursuant to Article 74 CISG.
242
 Thus, it is the aggrieved party that bears 
the risk of unforeseeable loss. Thirdly, the promisee’s burden to prove that it incurred 
damage with reasonable certainty may mean that the party is not able to furnish proof of 
the whole loss, which further increases the difference between damages and actual full 
compensation.
243
  
Finnish jurisprudence in the areas of contract and tort law conventionally views the 
principle of full compensation as comprising two elements: the right to compensation for 
all damage (‘täysi korvaus’) on one hand, and the prohibition of overcompensation 
(‘rikastumiskielto’) on the other.244 In other words, the prohibition of overcompensation is 
seen as an integral part of the principle of full compensation. The traditional Finnish 
interpretation that the unavailability of overcompensation follows from the principle of full 
compensation could be justified on the basis of the wording of Article 74 CISG. It is 
possible to interpret the formulation ‘damages [---] consist of a sum equal to the loss’ as 
meaning, e contrario, that damages do not consist of anything more than the sum equal to 
the loss. While this argument is well-grounded, it is not the sole possible interpretation of 
the full compensation under the CISG. 
The content of the principle of full compensation intrinsically linked to the following 
discussion on the balancing act of the economic benefits principle and performance 
principle. There is thus no need to rush into conclusions regarding the principle of full 
compensation before the following analysis. 
5.2.2. Protection of the economic benefits in contrast to contractual 
performance 
This Subchapter aims to compare and balance the economic benefits principle versus the 
performance principle. Furthermore, the part discusses a proposition of hypotheticals 
where it has been considered that the performance principle to requires granting 
disgorgement.
245
 In the very first Chapter of this study, I enquired whether contractual 
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remedies exist to secure the mere financial results of a contract, or the very performance of 
the obligations. This question is central for the following discussion.  
To first introduce the principles that this Subchapter compares, the ‘economic benefits 
principle’ denotes the idea that contractual damages compensate for lost economic 
benefits. A strict application of the principle supports the application of the differential 
theory that is only willing to take into account economic losses that appear on a balance 
sheet. The principle follows from the general theory that the law of damages protects the 
contracting parties’ economic positions.246 
The economic benefits principle follows from the view that compensation is the sole 
purpose of damages.
247
 However, other commentators take a stance that compensation is 
only one of several objectives. Prevention of breach of contract has also been advocated as 
a goal of contractual damages.
248
  
The ‘performance principle’ refers to the idea that the law of damages protects the 
contracting parties’ interest in performance. The principle encompasses the thought that 
contracting parties do not conclude contracts to obtain monetary compensation, but to 
receive the adequate performance.
249
 The performance principle includes the notion that 
damages are not a sufficiently effective remedy if the breaching party manages to profit 
from the breach of contract.
250
  
The reason why balancing these principles is relevant to disgorgement relates to the 
analysis regarding the principle of full compensation in the preceding Subchapter. The 
economic benefits principle speaks for the application of the above mentioned differential 
theory in determining what constitutes a loss. However, if one were to emphasize the 
performance principle, a larger understanding of a loss would come to question. 
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The economic benefits principle mainly derives from the wording of Article 74 CISG and 
the e contrario reasoning that contractual damages only consist of a sum equal to the loss, 
but do not comprise more.
251
 The economic benefits principle is not categorical under the 
Convention. An absolute adherence to the principle would oppose abstract calculations of 
damages, such as provided for by Article 76 CISG.
252
 
The commentators that have discussed the performance principle under the CISG have 
relied on the availability of a claim for specific performance as a legal basis for the 
principle.
253
 Further, the principle can also be derived from a closely related ideal of 
upholding contracts (‘favor contractus’). The principle of upholding contracts entails that a 
solution that leads to the continued validity of a contract should be favoured over the 
contract’s premature termination. The ideal is exhibited by several articles in the CISG, 
such as Article 25 CISG, which sets out a high threshold for a fundamental breach entitling 
the aggrieved party to avoid the contract.
254
 
The CISG Advisory Council has noted the increasing emphasis on the performance 
principle in its opinion no. 10, concerning liquidated damages in a CISG contract. While 
the Advisory Council does not explicitly assert that damages under the CISG should be 
interpreted in light of the performance principle, it does make predictions on the future 
interpretations of the CISG that it based on a shift from the economic benefits principle to 
the performance principle.
255
 Taking into account the, at least theoretical, importance of 
the CISG Advisory Council, its proposition speaks for the increasing importance of the 
performance principle.
256
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Prof. Schwenzer has formulated case examples where she maintains that the performance 
principle in itself requires that a breaching party should not be entitled to benefit from a 
breach of contract. Therefore, she argues, the aggrieved party should be entitled to the 
breaching party’s profit.257 These examples do not so much shed light on the question of 
whether the performance principle should prevail over the economic benefits principle, but 
they are helpful in concretising the balancing act, and illustrating what a different emphasis 
as regards the principles means in practice. 
The first case example concerns a second sale where the seller sells the goods to another 
buyer at a higher price, thereby realising a higher profit than agreed under the first 
contract. In the second case, the seller undertakes to manufacture goods under humane 
conditions, but breaches the contract by resorting to non-conforming mechanisms that 
reduce production costs. In the third constellation, the buyer sells goods to a market despite 
having undertaken to not supply the goods to that location.
258
 
The three hypotheticals are different in terms of whether the promisee incurs loss in the 
sense of the economic benefits principle.  The aggrieved party of the first case example, 
the second sale, is in the best position in this respect. The promisee of that case is the 
likeliest to incur economic loss even in terms of the economic benefits principle. The 
promisee may incur damage in the form of loss of profit, for example. Such loss is not 
difficult to calculate if the promisee had already concluded contracts for the sale of the 
non-delivered goods.
259
 
In the two other case examples, the non-defaulting party does not necessarily sustain 
economic loss. In addition, the most probable form of damage that the aggrieved party 
could claim in these constellations, loss of goodwill, is notoriously difficult to define, let 
alone prove and quantify.
260
 As it is possible that no compensatory damages become 
payable in relation to these two hypothetical breaches, conventional compensatory 
damages do not seem to fulfil the need to protect the contractual performance. 
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A possible counterargument for the proposition that the performance principle requires 
disgorgement could be to suggest that a claim for specific performance is sufficient to 
protect the promisee’s right to performance.261 However, as regards the foregoing 
constellations, specific performance would only be appropriate in the first case example, 
i.e. second sale. However, a claim for specific performance is not compatible with the two 
other hypotheticals. The damage is already done when the goods have already been 
manufactured in inhumane conditions, or when the market boasts with the goods that were 
not supposed to end up into it. 
Moreover, Schwenzer’s second hypothetical is of particular interest from a policy 
perspective. The obligation to manufacture the goods humanely has much more value than 
the promisee’s sheer economic interest in the manufacturing process. The promisor’s 
obligation is relevant for, inter alia, the health of the manufacturing employees. The 
economic benefits principle fails to take into account and protect non-economic interests 
that underlie some contractual obligations.
262
 
Prof. Schwenzer’s examples of cases where she suggests that disgorgement be granted, 
illustrate the differences of the two principles. The goal of protecting contractual 
performance can be considered to call for an additional remedy in part of the case 
examples, as it is possible that no compensatory damages become payable in relation to a 
clear breach of contract, even though non-economic damage occurs. On the other hand, a 
claim for specific performance could be seen as adequately protecting the promisee of one 
of the examples. 
To briefly summarise the discussion above, the two principles derive from different parts 
of the CISG. While the economic benefits principle follows from the wording of the 
Article 74 CISG, a strict adherence to the former principle is unwarranted under the 
Convention, as Article 76 CISG illustrates.
263
 The legal grounds for the performance 
principle relate to the availability of specific performance and the ideal of upholding 
contracts, which is exhibited by the high threshold of avoiding a contract under Article 25 
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CISG.
264
 Furthermore, the CISG Advisory Council has noted the increasing importance of 
the performance principle over the economic benefits principle. 
In conclusion to the examination of the economic benefits principle and performance 
principle, neither of the principles clearly prevails over the other. However, the 
formulation Article 74 CISG limits the possible inferences that can be drawn from the 
balancing act of the principles. Even if an interpreter chooses to emphasize the 
performance principle over the economic benefits principle, they should not grant a 
remedy that is in glaring conflict with the wording of the article. In light of the formulation 
of Article 74 CISG, awarding a disgorgement remedy that does not have any regard for the 
amount of loss appears problematic.
265
  
Despite the foregoing, an interpreter can and should put into practice the principle 
requiring the protection of the contractual performance. A more justified approach could 
be to interpret the term ‘loss’ in an expansive manner.266 For example, an interpreter could 
attempt to value the non-economic interest in performance in monetary terms.  
5.2.3. Good faith in international trade 
To top off the discussion on the principles underlying the Convention, the final issue of 
interest concerns the principle of good faith. Arguably the significance of the principle of 
good faith for disgorgement relates to the question of how demonstrations of bad faith on 
behalf of the breaching party affect the interpretation of Article 74 CISG.
267
 In other 
words, the question in this Subchapter is whether considerations of good faith should play 
a role in determining if the case warrants an expansive understanding of the formulation of 
Article 74 CISG. To clarify the premises of this Subchapter, it examines good faith as a 
principle that guides the interpretation of Article 74 CISG, and not as a substantive 
obligation imposed on the contracting parties.
268
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As noted above, the term ‘good faith’ has diverging meanings and statuses in domestic 
laws,
269
 which may be the reason why the concept appears to have been particularly 
difficult to interpret in the context of the CISG
270
. For example, a German court concluded 
that it would violate the principle of good faith to insist on an explicit declaration of 
avoidance in case the seller has refused to perform its obligations, although the Convention 
expressly requires a declaration of avoidance.
271
 Furthermore, case law is divided on the 
question of whether the CISG imposes on the parties an obligation to act in good faith.
272
 
The concept of good faith has been put into practice under the CISG as forbidding the 
deliberate pursuit of self-interest, the exploitation of dominance over others and dishonest 
behaviour.
273
 To form an image of what good faith denotes in an international setting, also 
the PICC 2010 employs the concept.
274
 It is relevant to note that in contrast to the starting 
point of this Subchapter, which examines good faith as a principle of interpretation, the 
PICC 2010 imposes an obligation on the parties to act in good faith.
275
 In construing the 
principle, the commented version of the PICC 2010 takes into account the standards of 
business practice in a certain trade, and the socio-economic environment in question, as 
well as the size and skills of the contracting parties.
276
 
The viewpoint offered by PICC regarding the context of international trade point seems 
appropriate for the CISG, as the Convention is similarly concerned with cross-border 
business. Therefore, the determination of whether certain behaviour goes against the 
principle of good faith would consider whether such practice contradicts a certain standard 
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of behaviour, which is determined on the basis of the elements set out in PICC 2010 and 
mentioned above. 
Even with the aforementioned guidance to good faith in international trade, it is difficult to 
piece together a general definition of what the concept entails. Perhaps the notion should 
be seen as a ‘catch-all provision’ for conduct that is reprehensible taking into account the 
context and the facts, rather than attempting to strictly define it.
277
 In other words, the 
promotion of good faith in the application of the CISG entails discouraging reprehensible 
conduct, taking into account the standards of business practice in a certain trade, and the 
socio-economic environment in question, as well as the size and skills of the contracting 
parties. In the context of Article 74 CISG, this would imply that the ideal of good faith in 
international trade could play a role in the assessment of what is categorised as loss.
278
 
However, such an interpretation should not contradict the formulation of Article 74 CISG. 
5.3. Adras Chmorey Binyan v. Harlow & Jones Gmbh 
As the final issue of the Chapter that examines the availability of a true disgorgement 
remedy under the CISG, this Subchapter introduces a case where a court granted 
disgorgement in the context of international sales.
279
 Even though the previous Chapters 
have allowed to draw conclusions on the issue even before visiting this aspect, reviewing 
this case illustrates what kind of arguments can, and cannot, be used to support granting 
disgorgement damages. 
The applicable law in the Adras
280
 case was ULIS (Convention relating to a Uniform Law 
for the International Sale of Goods, 1964), the less successful predecessor of the CISG.
281
 
The decision is relevant for the modern Convention as the damages provision under ULIS 
was nearly identical to that of the CISG.
282
 
In 1973, a German seller contracted to sell iron to an Israeli buyer. The Yom Kippur war 
caused a delay in delivery, but the seller managed to deliver a part of the iron in early 
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1974. In April 1974, the seller notified the buyer that due to high storage costs, it will have 
to sell the remaining part of the iron to third parties. The buyer replied by demanding the 
delivery of the rest of the iron that it was entitled to under the contract. Notwithstanding 
the reply, the seller sold the iron to third parties at a higher price than what it would have 
received under the contract. The buyer filed a claim for damages, and alternatively for the 
‘restitution’ of the seller’s profit, i.e. disgorgement.283 
The Supreme Court first dismissed the buyer’s claims in 1983. Firstly, court found that the 
buyer had not proven that it had incurred loss as a consequence of the breach of contract. 
Secondly, the court ruled that the buyer could not rely on Article 84 ULIS. The article 
provided that if a contract is avoided, the party claiming damages may recover the 
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time of avoidance. 
According to the court, the buyer had not avoided contract, as the claim that the buyer had 
filed did not constitute an avoidance of contract.
284
 In addition, the market price of the iron 
had returned to its former level, and therefore there was nothing to recover as the 
difference between the contract price and the market price.
285
 
Thirdly, the court dismissed the buyer’s claim based on the law of unjust enrichment. The 
buyer had claimed that the profit that the seller made should be regarded as unjust 
enrichment. The court rejected the claim on the grounds that the law of unjust enrichment 
does not apply if there is no contract between the parties. However, the third claim was 
later re-assessed in a further hearing with an extended panel. The court decided to reverse 
its first decision and decided to award the profits to the buyer.
286
 
The Supreme Court’s decision to grant the seller’s profit to the buyer was not grounded on 
ULIS, but rather the Israeli law of restitution.
287
 However, the court’s reasoning is 
interesting from the point of view of ULIS and thereby the CISG. The mere fact that the 
court applied the unjust enrichment norms to a contractual dispute deserves attention. The 
court found that the general principle against unjust enrichment enables the restitution of 
gains made at the expense of another. In the decision, Levin J. stated that if a contractual 
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cause of action overlaps with a cause of action under the law of restitution, the claims are 
alternative.
288
 
Barak J. compared the Israeli unjust enrichment law to a ‘great eagle which spreads its 
winds over all other laws’. He suggested that contract law remedies do not only protect 
reliance interest and expectation interest, but also a third interest prohibiting unjust 
enrichment. Hence, the claimant may be simultaneously entitled to several remedies 
available under the law of obligations so long as the claimant does not obtain unjust 
enrichment through the availability of multiple remedies.
289
  
On a terminological side note, it is misleading to call the restitution of unjust enrichment a 
‘remedy’ in the sense of a remedy for breach of contract.290 Unjust enrichment is rather a 
separate regime than an alternative remedy for breach of contract.
291
 However, in practice, 
the regime of unjust enrichment constitutes an alternative tool to claim additional 
compensation for breach of contract, if one accepts that unjust enrichment norms can be 
applied even where the parties have concluded a contract. 
The question of the scope of the Israeli unjust enrichment law is relevant, as domestic 
remedies may overlap with the remedies under the CISG just as they did in the Adras case. 
The tension between the domestic legal system and the international sales law has been 
referred to as the cleavage of statutes.
292
 The cleavage of statutes is typically due to the 
dissonance of general principles in the national contract law on one hand and the 
international sales law on the other.
293
 In this case, the overdriving effect of the Israeli 
unjust enrichment law causes the dissonance. 
If the parties to a CISG contract are allowed to invoke domestic remedies alternatively or 
in addition to CISG remedies, parties in different contracting states of the Convention may 
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end up in different positions, as a domestic remedy in one country may not be applicable in 
another. This contradicts with the starting point of the CISG that aggrieved parties in the 
same situation in different jurisdictions should receive the same remedial treatment, for 
example the same amount of compensation.
294
 
On one hand, the CISG only represents the sales law of the applicable legal system. The 
CISG has to be supplemented by other rules, such as the law regulating the validity of the 
contract or the transfer of ownership.
295
 It is normal for the norms ‘surrounding’ the CISG 
to vary from one jurisdiction to another. The law of unjust enrichment could be viewed as 
one example of a set of norms that may result in diverging end results in different CISG 
countries. 
However, the foregoing analysis ignores the fact that remedies for breach of contract fall 
into the scope of the CISG. While the surrounding areas of law do vary from one country 
to another, the norms that concern the scope of the CISG should not vary.
296
 The purpose 
of the CISG is to offer a neutral international sales law, and legal certainty for the 
contracting parties. The general idea is that neither party to an international sales contract 
will not have to become acquainted with a foreign legal framework where the CISG 
applies, as the CISG leads to the same results everywhere.
 297
  Accepting the application of 
overlapping national remedies means that the parties have to be prepared for additional 
remedies arising from the applicable domestic law. This undermines legal certainty in 
choosing the CISG. 
The Israeli Supreme Court justified stripping the profits from the seller with contract law 
arguments. The court emphasised the fact that a breach of contract should not be treated 
lightly. Levin and Barak JJ. criticised the idea of efficient breach and maintained that the 
disgorgement of profits functions as deterrence against breach of contract.
298
 In addition, 
the court referred to the fact that under the Israeli contract law, specific performance is the 
primary remedy for breach of contract. It appears that the court’s values as regards the 
acceptability of an efficient breach, the Israeli good faith obligation and the obligation to 
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behave in a trustworthy manner strongly impacted the court’s reasoning as regards the 
reconciliation of overlapping remedies.
299
 The Israeli values and legal concepts concerning 
contract law should be irrelevant for the case, as the applicable contract law was ULIS 
instead of the Israeli contract law. 
To conclude, the reasoning and conclusion of the Adras case are problematic in a number 
of respects. Firstly, the application of unjust enrichment norms as supplementary remedies 
to ULIS poses concerns as to the uniformity of remedies available under contracts that 
provide for a uniform law as the applicable set of norms. Secondly, the court seems to have 
applied an international sales law according to Israeli principles, which should not play a 
comparable role in applying an international piece of legislation. Therefore, the Adras case 
rather represents an example of the problems surrounding uniformity in application than a 
significant case to take example of. 
 
6. MEASURING LOSS BY THE BREACHING PARTY’S PROFIT 
Compensatory damages may lead to the same end result as disgorgement: stripping the 
breaching party of the profit made by a breach. However, as noted earlier in the 
introductory part, a true disgorgement remedy is not the same as quantifying damages in 
accordance with the breaching party’s profit, even if the end result of the two remedies can 
be the same.
300
  
The previous Chapter assesses granting disgorgement for breach of contract irrespective of 
the aggrieved party’s loss (or lack thereof). This section analyses the use of the breaching 
party’s profit as a measurement in the calculation of compensatory damages under the 
CISG. In the terminology of this work, the key difference between the quantification of 
damages according to profit on one hand, and disgorgement on the other, is loss caused by 
the breach. Granting disgorgement in its pure form does not require that the aggrieved 
party has suffered damage. By contrast, if the aggrieved party has not suffered loss, they 
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are not entitled to damages. In addition, questions of proof should be dealt with differently 
in case of disgorgement on one hand and quantification on the other.
301
 
This section commences by discussing the legal framework of the quantification of loss 
under Article 74 CISG and how the breaching party’s profit may be relevant in the process. 
Subsequently, the Chapter goes on to introduce a case where profit made by breach of 
contract was used in the calculation of loss.  
6.1.  Quantification of damages under Article 74 CISG  
To begin from the start, quantification of damages is an issue of both fact and law. Law 
determines the standard of compensation and the object of quantification. The standard of 
compensation can be, for example, adequate compensation, fair market value or full 
compensation.
302
 Under the CISG, the relevant standard of compensation is full 
compensation.
303
  
In determining the object of quantification, the court or tribunal assesses which costs the 
breaching party is liable to compensate. This consists of several elements, such as the 
recoverability of the type of loss, causal link, foreseeability and whether the aggrieved 
party could have avoided the loss.
304
 It is only after the determination of the object that the 
quantification may take place, and it is important that these two phases not be confused. 
Determining the object of quantification is mainly a legal issue, while the quantification 
itself is more concerned with whether a fact has been shown. Confusing these different 
stages may lead to the erroneous conclusion that difficulty in quantifying a category of loss 
means that a type of loss is not recoverable at all.
305
 
The breaching party’s profits are relevant for the process of quantification, and not as 
pertinent in determining the object of quantification. The reason why study discusses the 
object of quantification is to prepare the ground for the following analysis of the 
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quantification itself. Furthermore, the aforementioned expansive reading of the term ‘loss’ 
affects the assessment of whether a loss is recoverable.
306
 
6.1.1. Determining the object of quantification 
In determining the object of quantification, the broadest question to be answered is whether 
a type of loss is recoverable. To clarify, the ‘type of damage’ refers to categories of loss 
that the promisor is liable for. These may include reduced value, loss of profit or storage 
expenses. Despite the starting point of full compensation, not all types of damage are 
recoverable under the CISG. Some types fall out of the scope of the Convention.
307
 In 
assessing the recoverability of a type of loss, the conclusions of the previous Chapter may 
come to play. The performance principle can be taken into account in the determination of 
whether a type of loss is recoverable.
308
 
The breaching party’s profit is more likely to be relevant for the quantification of certain 
types of loss than other ones. The most evident example of where the profit may be of use 
is determining the aggrieved party’s loss of profit. This means compensation for profit that 
the promisee did not obtain due to the breach of contract.  
Loss of profit can be seen as consisting of different components: loss of profit, and loss of 
future profit. The former means profit that the aggrieved party would have made for a 
resale of goods pursuant to an agreement that was already in place before the breach of 
contract. The latter, on the other hand, denotes profit that the buyer could have received if 
it managed to resell goods that it was due to receive under a sales contract, but that it had 
                                                 
306
 This is a reference to the conclusion of Subchapter 5.2.2 in the previous Chapter: While granting monetary 
compensation in a case where the aggrieved party has not sustained loss is not in line with the Convention, 
the performance principle may under certain circumstances call for an expansive interpretation of what 
constitutes loss. 
307
 Schwenzer (n 38) 1005, para 18, has argued that ‘recoverability [of a type of damage] has to be 
determined in accordance with the overall objective of the CISG to achieve full compensation in view of the 
particular purpose of the contract’. As an undisputed exception to the main rule, compensation for personal 
injury or death is not within the scope of the CISG (Art. 5 CISG).   
Furthermore, there is wide academic discussion regarding the compensability of legal costs under the CISG, 
see, e.g. Peter Schlechtriem, ‘Legal Costs as Damages in the Application of UN Sales Law’ (2006) 26 
Journal of Law and Commerce 71 and Harry Flechtner, ‘Recovering Attorneys' Fees as Damages under the 
U.N. Sales Convention (CISG)’ (2002) 22(2) Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 121. 
308
 The conclusion of Subchapter 4.2.2 was that the performance principle may under certain circumstances 
call for an expansive interpretation of what constitutes loss. 
59 
 
not bound itself to sell.
309
 The recoverability of loss of future profit is somewhat 
controversial.
310
  
If a court or a tribunal finds loss of future profit not to be compensable under the CISG, the 
usefulness of a reference to the breaching party’s profit diminishes. This is because the 
breaching party’s profit is not relevant for calculating loss of profit under an existing 
contract for resale. It is possible to calculate such loss of profit in accordance with the 
contract. 
Further questions that may arise at the stage of determining the object of quantification 
relate to causality and the foreseeability of loss, which are prerequisites for compensation 
under Article 74 CISG. In addition, it may be necessary to determine whether a certain loss 
could have been avoided, or whether a measure that caused costs was reasonable for the 
aggrieved party to take.
311
 The latter issue is relevant as the aggrieved party is entitled to 
compensation for the costs of measures that were taken in order to place it in the same 
position where it would have been in had the contract been properly performed.
312
 
6.1.2. Quantifying damage 
The norms concerning the quantification of damages under the CISG are fairly flexible.  
The established main rule is that the full compensation of the relevant types of loss should 
be calculated in the manner that is best suited to the circumstances in each individual case 
(‘the most appropriate method rule’).313 The flexibility of the most appropriate method 
rule is due to the great variety of situations that Article 74 CISG regulates. The scope of 
the provision particularly broad as it encompasses the breach of any obligation by either 
the buyer or the seller. Thus, the rule relates to a great variety of cases.
314
  
It is unclear what kind of criteria are relevant in establishing the most appropriate method. 
The accuracy of the calculation is an evident factor. In addition, it appears justifiable to 
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balance the accuracy criterion with the procedural burden of the method. In other words, if 
a method is extremely accurate, but requires a great amount of research, it seems 
appropriate to opt for a less accurate method that involves a less burdensome process. The 
choice of course depends on the circumstances of the case. 
The Secretariat Commentary on the draft counterpart of Article 74 CISG contains 
examples of appropriate ways to calculate loss. In one example, the breach of contract 
concerns the non-conformity of goods, more specifically, grain that had more moisture 
than it was allowed under the contract. In this case, the buyer incurred two types of loss: 
decreased value of the grain and drying expenses. According to the Secretariat 
Commentary, the loss is calculated as follows:  
Table 1: Calculation of damages in case of non-conforming grain 
 
In cases where damages compensate the decrease in value and drying expenses, it is 
difficult to see how the profit that the promisor may make by the breach of contract could 
play a role in the quantification. Furthermore, in the Secretariat Commentary example of 
non-conforming grain, the most appropriate method of calculation is obvious enough to be 
unlikely to cause disaccord between the parties. The parties may of course have differing 
views as to the valuation of the costs, e.g. what the value of the grain would have been if it 
had been conforming.  
In other cases, defining the most appropriate calculation method may be a more complex 
task. Difficulties arise when the promisee has incurred loss of further profit, or loss of 
goodwill.
316
 It is possible to construe a situation where the profit that the promisor obtains 
is somehow linked to the value of the loss of profit that the promisee suffers. For example, 
in case a seller breaches a contract by selling the goods to a second buyer, one can argue 
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The value that the grain would have had if it was conforming     $55,000 
The value of the grain as delivered - $51,000 
The damage that arises out of the decreased value  $  4,000 
Expenses of drying the grain + $  1,500 
 
Loss arising out of the breach in total 
  
$  5,500
315
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that the first buyer could have resold the goods at the same profit.
 317
 The following figure 
illustrates this point: 
Figure 1: connection of lost profits and the profit that arises out of the breach in a 
second sale situation 
 
 
In Figure 1, the profit that the Seller obtains by selling the goods to the Buyer 2 instead of 
the Buyer 1 amounts to EUR 20, i.e. EUR 120 (the price that Buyer 2 is willing to pay) – 
EUR 100 (the price under the original contract) = EUR 20. On the other hand, if the Buyer 
1 had received the goods and been able to sell the goods to the Buyer 2 at the same price as 
the Seller did, the profit would have also amounted to EUR 20, i.e. EUR 120 (the price that 
the Buyer 2 would have paid) – EUR 100 (the price that Buyer 1 would have paid to the 
Seller). 
In addition to the most appropriate method rule, the calculation method should primarily be 
a concrete method. The alternative is an abstract calculation.
318
 The concrete measure of 
damages means calculating costs that have actually been incurred by the non-defaulting 
party. In the context of non-delivery, this means that if the buyer manages to acquire 
substitute products, the damage is defined as the difference between the price of the 
substitute and the non-delivered product.
319
 
                                                 
317
 DeLong (n 85) 748. 
318
 Schwenzer (n 38) 1016, para 41. The same starting point has been expressed in the Jeans case 1999 
(Court of Appeal Hamburg) where the breach of contract was the non-conformity of the goods. In the case, 
the court calculated damages on the basis of the profit that the aggrieved buyer had obtained for the resale of 
corresponding undamaged goods. 
319
 Schwenzer, Hachem and Kee (n 5) 624, para. 44.222. 
62 
 
In an abstract calculation, damages are calculated on the basis of hypothetical costs. To use 
the previous example of non-delivery, the damage would be determined as the difference 
between the market price of a substitute product and the non-delivered product.
320
 Article 
76 CISG, which is applicable when the contract has been avoided, warrants an abstract 
calculation of damages if no substitute transaction has been entered into. 
The profit that the breaching party makes can be relevant to an abstract calculation, as in 
certain markets, the profit may function as proof of the market price. This could 
conceivably be the case if the goods are scarce, and it is difficult to determine the market 
price due to the low number of transactions in the market. Any suggestion as to the value 
of the goods can be useful for the determination if the goods are unique.
321
  
The relevant rules that follow from the CISG have now been introduced. Evidently, 
applying the norms in accordance with facts is the necessary next step. In a legal 
proceeding, questions of proof sneak in with the facts. Before the application of rules, a 
court or a tribunal has to determine which facts have been established with a sufficient 
degree.
322
 
The burden of furnishing the proof of loss and its quantity rests on the aggrieved party.
323
 
In addition, the scope of this burden extends to showing the approximate quantum of 
damages. The aggrieved party is required to prove the extent of damages and provide a 
basis for the court or tribunal to estimate the quantum of damages.
324
  
In providing a damages calculation that proves the extent of damages, the aggrieved party 
justifies why the court or the tribunal should calculate damages in a certain way – for 
example, by reference to the breaching party’s profit. If the breaching party prefers another 
method of calculation, they will have to show that an alternative method would be better 
suited to the circumstances of the case.
325
 In view of this aspect, true disgorgement is 
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different from quantifying loss by reference to the profit arising out of the breach. If the 
CISG provided for the pure form of disgorgement, the aggrieved party would not have the 
burden to prove that the profit correlates with the loss. 
As the final point relating to the quantification of loss, a commentator has noted that taking 
the breaching party’s profit into account is appropriate where calculating is otherwise 
difficult.
326
 Requiring difficulty implies that the breaching party’s profits should only be a 
secondary means of calculating loss. However, at first sight it would appear unnecessary to 
require difficulty of calculating damages if the aggrieved party manages to prove that the 
breaching party’s profit is the method of calculation that yields the most accurate result. 
One justification for raising the threshold of using the breaching party’s profit relates to the 
procedure of acquiring proof. Primarily, it is the aggrieved party that provides the damages 
calculation, together with figures and proof of valuations.
327
 However, the non-defaulting 
party is typically not able to provide documentation on the breaching party’s profit. In 
order for a court or a tribunal to calculate damages on the basis of the defaulting party’s 
profit, the latter has to furnish proof to enable a calculation of the profit. This effectively 
means shifting a part of the burden to prove and calculate damages to the breaching party, 
and possibly disturbing the balance between the contracting parties and the system of 
burden of proof under the CISG. This viewpoint could justify setting an additional 
threshold for the use of the profit in calculation. 
To conclude this discussion, using the profit as a measurement stick for the damage that 
the aggrieved party incurs fits into the framework of quantifying damages under the CISG. 
However, this requires that the aggrieved party shows that using the profit is the most 
appropriate method of calculation for the loss. Furthermore, a court or a tribunal 
considering the option of using the profits in calculation should take into account what this 
method entails with respect to the procedure. 
6.2. Pressure sensors case 
The profit made by the breaching party was used as a basis of the calculation of contractual 
damages under the CISG in an arbitration case administered by the Stockholm Chamber of 
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Commerce in 2007.
328
 I introduce the case as illustration of a constellation where it is 
questionable whether the breaching parry’s profit constitutes the most appropriate method 
to calculate the aggrieved party’s loss.  
The case concerned a sales contract between a Chinese buyer and a Brazilian seller. Under 
the agreement that was concluded in 2002, the seller undertook to supply pressure sensors 
to the buyer, and license the devices to be integrated with the buyer’s products. The sales 
contract also included a confidentiality clause, prohibiting the parties from using the 
information to purposes other than the performance of the sales contract.
329
 
The buyer claimed that delivered sensors did not perform in compliance with the contract 
in certain temperatures. As the parties could not resolve the disagreement as to the alleged 
non-conformity of the sensors, the buyer commenced arbitration claiming damages. The 
tribunal rejected the buyer’s claim for damages, finding that the buyer had failed to prove 
that the goods were defective.
330
 
However, the seller filed a counterclaim alleging that the buyer had copied the buyer’s 
source code, thereby breaching the confidentiality clause of the sales contract. Pursuant to 
the sales contract, the buyer’s engineers had visited the seller’s facilities in Brazil to 
implement the plan to integrate the seller’s sensors to the buyer’s products. The tribunal 
noted that the source codes of the seller and buyer bore significant similarities, which the 
buyer argued to be coincidental. The tribunal found seller’s argument of illicit copying 
more convincing. The tribunal considered the copying to constitute misuse of confidential 
information under the sales contract.
331
 
In assessing the seller’s loss arising from the breach, the Tribunal focused on the benefit 
that the buyer had received. The Tribunal maintained that the advantage that the seller had 
obtained by the unauthorised use of information was receiving a head start for developing 
the technical solution in the code. The Tribunal concluded that the buyer could have 
produced the same code in 24 months’ time without breaching the contract.332 
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The Tribunal decided award the seller damages in the amount of the buyer’s sales during a 
24-month period.
333
 The Tribunal did not justify this mode of calculation of the loss, but 
merely stated that ‘there is no scientific way to assess damages in cases of this nature’.334 
A reasonable explanation for the tribunal’s calculation method would be to argue that if the 
buyer had not sold similar pressure sensors during the 24-month period, the seller would 
have been able to generate the same amount of sales as the buyer now did. 
However, an argument that the seller would have generated less or more profit is 
conceivable. In the case, the parties even sold different products: the buyer’s goods were 
pressure transmitters where the seller’s sensors were integrated.335 It does not seem far-
fetched to claim that the buyer’s revenue for the sales of the transmitters does not 
accurately correspond to what the seller would have obtained for selling pressure sensors. 
In addition to the contribution that the Pressure sensors case offers to the substantive 
damages calculation, the case also illustrates the evidentiary hurdles that are associated 
with calculating loss by reference to the profit arising out of the loss. Unfortunately it is 
not possible to analyse the issues relating to evidence in this study. This is mainly because 
the scope of the CISG merely extends to burden of proof, and no other aspects of evidence 
or procedure. Thus, the norms regarding evidence from one CISG contracting state to 
another.
336
 However, adding a brief note on the evidentiary matters that the Pressure 
sensors case illustrates is irresistible. The case is particularly suitable for the international 
theme of this study, as it features an international arbitration between parties that originate 
from countries with different customs for evidentiary disclosure.
337
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The case involved the disclosure of documents, which the tribunal described as having 
been a ‘difficult and sensitive’ issue throughout the proceedings.338 Confidential 
information contained in the material was one of the problems of the case. The documents 
that the breaching buyer was ordered to provide contained confidential information, and 
thus the tribunal allowed to redact parts of the documents as trade secrets.
 339
  
It is conceivable that even the amount of the breaching party’s profit constitutes such a 
valuable trade secret that divulging it is disproportionate in view of the usefulness of the 
information to the procedure. Courts and tribunals should resolve the conflict between the 
need to keep trade secrets confidential, and the information’s relevance for the process, in 
accordance with the applicable procedural norms. The rules on confidentiality and 
privilege vary greatly in different jurisdictions,
340
 and therefore the deliberation may yield 
diverging results in different fori. 
To conclude, this study has reflected on the disgorgement of profits under the CISG 
through three different research questions. To summarise each of the conclusions I drew, I 
first argued that the pro-disgorgement trend should not influence the interpretation of the 
CISG. This view was based on the brief review concerning the development to expand the 
scope of disgorgement damages, which does not concern the majority of the CISG states. 
Taking such a trend into account in the interpretation of the CISG involves a significant 
risk of fragmenting the interpretation. 
Secondly, I argued that the CISG does not provide for a true disgorgement remedy. While 
the argument that the interpretation of the CISG should protect contractual performance is 
convincing, an interpretation based on principles should not override the wording of the 
provision. However, I suggested that an interpreter can put the performance principle into 
practice by interpreting the term ‘loss’ expansively.  
Thirdly, I maintained that calculating the aggrieved party’s loss by reference to the 
breaching party’s profit is in line with Article 74 CISG. This requires, however, that the 
aggrieved party can prove that using the profit is the most appropriate method of 
calculation for the loss. Furthermore, a court or a tribunal faced with a proposition to use 
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this method should take into account what this method entails with respect to the 
procedure. 
Finally, as regards the bigger question of whether breach of contract pays – yes, it 
sometimes does, as the CISG does not warrant stripping the profits of the breaching party. 
If one considers that this conclusion is unbearable, an interpreter cannot change the 
approach of the CISG, not by observing domestic influences or applying the principles 
under the Convention. It is the legislator, not the interpreter, who can choose whether 
breach of an international sales contract pays. 
